Overview
On the sixth of January 2005 a north bound Norfolk and Southern freight train inadvertently left the mainline and entered a siding near Granitville, South Carolina (Parker L. 2005). The 42 car north bound train collided with another train waiting on the siding. The accident resulted in the derailment of sixteen cars "three chlorine cars (gas) and one sodium hydroxide (liquid)"(Environmental Protection Agency 2005). The National Transportation and Safety Board reported that the collision occurred at 2:40 AM EST (National Transportation and Safety Board 2005). At least 250 were injured in the accident 5400 people were evacuated from the area around the spill and nine people died.
Although the event took place just before 3 am, the Chief Engineer of WBBQ Augusta Georgia (just over the state line from Graniteville) stated that it was not until 5:30 am that their station (the LP1) received an EAS notification. WBBQ (a Clear Channel Station) and other stations in the area had already begun news coverage of the event shortly after the accident.

Summary of verified EAS Activation
1. WBBQ (Clear Channel) LP1 Augusta, GA. Sent EAS at 6:50 am 6 January 2005
2. WZNY (Clear Channel) LP2 Augusta, GA. Sent EAS at 6:50 am 6 January 2005
3. WFXA (Beesley Group) Monitor Augusta, GA Received EAS from WBBQ at 6:50 am 6 January 2005

It is still unclear how the news department at WBBQ got the word that a major derailment had occurred. Harley Drew program director at the LP1 WBBQ stated in an e-mail:

"We were contacted by the over-night producer at our news partner, WJBF-TV, around 3:30 am or. Our News Director go out of bed immediately and came to the station. I don't know right off the top of my head when we had our first reports on, but it before 5 AM as I understand it. By 6 AM we were pretty much in continuous coverage of the accident until about 7 PM, and then "breaking news" reports till midnight. We picked up the next day at 6 AM again with substantial coverage, including live airing of all press conferences by the Aiken County Sheriff's Department and the NTSB.

But it is verifiable that WBBQ was broadcasting news information about the derailment well before an EAS actuation had occurred. With respect to the EAS WBBQ fulfilled its LP1 responsibilities by relaying the CEM for its broadcasting area at around 6:50 that morning. Walter Brumbleoe chief engineer for the Beesly Broadcasting Group in Augusta, Georgia reported in a phone interview with this researcher that WFXA, one of the stations in the Beesly cluster of five stations did "receive an alert at 6:50 am, that said that the civil authorities have issued a civil emergency message for Aiken South Carolina beginning at 6:49 am. That message originated was from WBBQ" (Brumbeloe W. 2005). From the time of the origin of the event to the time of actuation of the EAS represents a lag time of four hours and ten minutes.
One explanation for this delay in the arrival of the EAS to WBBQ is provided by the Midlands South Carolina EAS coordinator Glenn Garrett of WCOS Columbia. Garrett suggests, "This was not a state emergency. It was a local emergency that should have been handled through the Aiken Augusta region. The gentleman in Aiken county should of gotten in touch with WBBQ or WZNY. Those were the local primary stations. They send out the local EAS (Garrett G. 2005). In contrast, John George Chairman of the South Carolina State Emergecy Communications Committee, suggest the rational for originating a message at the state level, that will ultimately be filtered to a local radio station:

"Any activation of an internal operational area would have to go through the warning point in Columbia at emergency management. Then they activate it. The reason we did that, if the nature of the emergency is that important, then the state should be involved in any decision making process process. That does not keep the local emergency manager from activating stations in an immediate area if he wants to go directly to stations or the news media. We can activate a region from the state warning point if they so decide. They can do that by going directly to the LP1 and LP2 in the operational area or they could relay that information through the SP1 through the daisy chain network" (George J. 2005).

Another explanation for the delay in the dissemination of the message in Graniteville, was the routing of the message itself. Earl Welsh, chief engineer for the LP1 and LP2 in the region states that their EAS boxes were listening to the wrong NWS source for the activation. 'Wrong' in the sense that even though WBBQ and WZNY had always listened to this source, that is, the Wrens NWS transmitter, the National Weather Service had not sent the originating civil emergency message to the Wrens transmitter.

        

"There are five (NWS) transmitters within our coverage area. We are unable to monitor all five of these. So we monitor the Wrens (Georgia) site which has the best signal. They did not initially send out that activation on the wrens site, because people in that coverage area were not directly effected. Even though someone in Graniteville may have been listening to Wrens, based on the fact that at one time that was the only thing that you could listen to around here; my assistant noticed what was going on because of the fact that it was a news story as well and they made a phone call to the weather service because we (EAS system) were listening to Wrens and we were trying to do the right thing. He (the assistant) heard the activation on the other tower we don't monitor on our personal receiver. We called them (NWS) and told them that hey you need to get that actuation on the Wrens site so we can get it on the air" (Welsh E. 2005).

Bernard Palmer, Meteorologist in Charge at the NWS in Columbia South Carolina confirms this stating:

"We had a call from SLED South Carolina Emergency State Law Enforcement Division at 5:25 AM requesting a briefing to aviation type operations over there (Graniteville). That was when we officially heard of the incident. The request for us to broadcast a CEM didn't occur I think at around 6 o'clock. We also phone the LP1 to verify they got the product. I have it noted in the log that they called us at 6:40 AM from BBQ stating that they only have the capability of monitoring Wrens transmitter. So it was at that time that re-broadcast it onto the Wrens transmitter" (Palmer B. 2005).

         Although somewhat late in delivery during this event, corrections were made as to the delivery point of the CEM and ultimately the EAS was activated and the CEM was sent electronically through the network. The system worked, not expediently, but it worked. However it should be noted in that the CEM was originally sent out through the AIken NWS transmitter, people listening to the Aiken transmitter were hearing the CEM prior to and after it had been disseminated through radio and the EAS. Steve Naglic, Warning Coordination Meteorologist for the NWS in Columbia, stated that, "We continued to transmit the EAS on the Aiken Transmitter WNG 627. The only reason it went to Wrens was that's what BBQ monitored. Aiken transmitter is the primary transmitter for Aiken county..."(Naglic S. 2005). This redundancy of delivery of the message with all hazards NWS radio provided another back up to the EAS system. In addition an CEM sent through weather radio into the EAS network will be the same product heard by people listening to a weather radio in that area.

          In contrast, although the system was activated through the electronic network, it is interesting to note the human interface which played a role in augmenting the EAS activation. It was news stories generated at the LP1 and LP2 WBBQ and WZNY, in the Clear Channel cluster, that put information about the event first on the air. Also, given that no official CEM was being delivered, it was Welsh and his assistant at the LP1 and LP2 that recognized and rectified the problem as the event unfolded by contacting the National Weather Service. Officials at the National Weather Service could quickly rectify the problem by simply send another CEM to the appropriate transmitter. Once again human intervention, communications and coordination is seen to be a crucial factor in providing efficient service at the local and state level.

"The biggest problem we have statewide, even in our emergency management office is that they do not understand how to use their box. They still want to pick up the phone and call and after hours they complain that no body is at the radio station. They have three different entry points into the EAS system using their box until emergency management people, here we are back to the people end of it utilize the technology to its maximum there will always be these issues" (George J. 2005).

          Welsh reported:

          "I don't know if the message ever went state wide. The folks in the Columbia office thought that they were activating, but apparently were not. I got a phone call from a gentleman up there around noon or one the next day asking about this. And I asked him, 'how are you activating this' and he said. 'he was pushing the button, and I asked, 'through what' and he said, 'through the same box I always activate through, and I said, 'you have never activated us before' and he said 'what?' I said, 'we get our monthly tests through a radio station in Columbia but to my knowledge you have never activated us'" (Welsh E. 2005)

John George, suggests:

 

"The one thing that we can say about the Graniteville, South Carolina incident is that I think we have to be thankful that it did happen in a county that did have a fairly strong emergency managing department and a lot of that is because of the Savannah River Site that's there and a lot of nuclear waste storage and processing. If that would have happened in some of the other counties in South Carolina where there is only one emergency manager and that might be a part time position, I'm not sure what the response time would be" (George J. 2005).

           O'Connor concurs that the association with local industries that have hazardous potentials assisted in the emergency operations at Graniteville. "With a nuclear facility, railways, mills and factories nearby, Aiken County fire, police and medical professionals have long prepared for the worst possible emergencies. That planning became reality early Thursday when a train crash released chlorine gas through the town of Graniteville. The response, several experts said, went smoothly. But it also might be a best-case scenario for emergency response in South Carolina" (O'Connor J. 2005).

In contrast Brittle suggested that, "The community had a rare resource, an emergency telephone ring-down system, but it was not activated for hours after the incident, then told people to shelter-in-place at first, when it should have told many to evacuate. Later, it was used to tell people to evacuate"(Brittle S. 2005). This is similar to what happened at Macdona, Texas where, in that case, the community telephone call in system was available but not used.

         The Graniteville event provides additional insight into how human systems must work with the technology to provide an efficient messaging system. In addition it suggests that radio stations can still be means of providing emergency messaging no matter what their cluster association. In fact, as also is the case in the Macdona, Texas event, sometimes these stations can provide pertinent emergency messages through their news outlets well before an official activation of the EAS system is engaged. George states, "I hear the talk all the time about the big companies but my feeling is that in any emergency there is such an outpouring of willingness to assist and provide information that it far exceeds what any of the complaints are. In my experience in dealing around South Carolina and some of the other states as well, the decision process, all the way up from or down to the emergency managers.... sometimes that process is more flawed than even the broadcasting side of it" (George J. 2005).

Bibliography

REF: NTSB: RAB http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2005/RAR0504.htm