OVERVIEW OF THIS STUDY

This research considers the following questions:

1. How is the new localism defined in contemporary broadcasting?
2. Does the Emergency Alert System work within the realm of the new Localism?
3. What role does localism play within the scope of the EAS?
4. How does the EAS equate with emergency public service broadcasting?

How is the new localism defined in contemporary broadcasting?
To answer this questions this research produced a case study of an event that has become known as the paramount example of the negative impact of the consolidation of media on local radio (Holdorf A. 2002). This landmark incident is the Canadian National Railway's derailment of a freight train carrying anhydrous ammonia.
On 18 January 2002 near Minot, North Dakota at 1:37 A.M. thirty one of a 112 car freight train derailed. Five of the cars that came off the tracks were tank cars that ruptured in the derailment (National Transportation Safety Board 2004). The accident occurred near the housing district of Tierracita Vallejo just one half mile west of Minot (National Transportation Safety Board 2002). The tank cars were carrying hundreds of thousands of gallons of anhydrous ammonia gas. The rupture produced an anhydrous ammonia cloud which spread east into the town of Minot just a few miles away. At the time of the accident the air temperature was below zero. This heavy, cold air mixed with the released anhydrous ammonia and flowed close to the surface creating a toxic atmosphere for breathing and reducing visibility to zero in some areas. One person died in the incident and over 1500 hundred people were hospitalized.

The Generalized Viewpoint Following the incident enormous public outcry emerged with respect to the hazards warning system in Minot. Wagner reports that in addition to public warning sirens not working, the 911 system being flooded with calls, and emergency responders not equipped for this kind of problem in the field, "Police called the TV and radio stations responsible for broadcasting emergency messages, hoping to spread the safety instructions. But the two local TV stations were off the air, and the radio stations were playing programming piped in by satellite"(Wagner S. 2002).

          In considering what went wrong at Minot, the role of local radio immediately was scrutinized. In the wake of Federal Communications deregulation and the emergence of multiple ownership rules for media, the rationale for what happened at KCJB was quickly shifted to the problems of big business, media consolidation and the consequent demise of localism (Newton G. 1995). Hundreds of articles have been produced in the print media and on the web tieing the problem of emergency messaging with radio station KCJB and its inability to provide EAS service that morning in Minot. Furthermore the problem has become associated with corporate radio in general and in particular the owner of KCJB, Clear Channel Broadcasting of San Antonio, Texas (Aggregate Technology Solutions 2004) (American's For Radio Diversity 2004) (Figueroa M., R. et al. 2004) (Staples B. 2003). In a study conducted by the Department of Media Studies University of San Francisco Kidd states:

"Then in January 2002, there was a chemical spill in Minot North Dakota, where Clear Channel owns all six radio stations, including the designated emergency broadcaster, KCJB. Yet no one responded to the call from Emergency Services because the station was on automatic, piping out a satellite feed. This was not unusual as Clear Channel only employs one full- time news employee in Minot, who rips and reads the newscasts from state and national wire services. For the author of Media Monopoly, Ben Bagdikian, the Minot story "demonstrates the systemic negligence of the public interest throughout the country," in which the people have been "robbed of their airwaves"and have lost local programming and accountability, a hallmark of US broadcasting" (Kidd D. 2004).

Speaking to the apparent relationship deregulation plays on this event Woosley states:

The rules would further sever the critical bond between media outlets and their local consumers, as more journalists would answer to corporate bosses making news judgments from thousands of miles away. This kind of estrangement can even jeopardize community security. Last year, when an early-morning train derailment in Minot, N.D., released dangerous toxins into the air, police tried to warn residents by alerting local radio stations. But according to the San Antonio Express-News, they could not reach anyone. Because Minot's radio stations are owned by Texas-based Clear Channel, they are not staffed at night" (Woosley L. 2003).

Clear Channel in Congress The KCJB, Clear Channel connection is clearly a touchstone in the ownership rules as congress becomes more concerned with growth of corporate media (Spula J. 2004). In January 2003 before a Senate Commerce Committee "lawmakers from both parties cautioned the Federal Communications Commission against weakening media ownership restrictions Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-N.D.) cited Minot's communications breakdown as one byproduct of consolidation" (Shields T. 2003). FCC Chairman, Michael K. Powell, an advocate for multiple ownership in radio markets, "declares there won't be radical changes to the current media ownership rules in response to Senators' concerns (Spula J. 2004).

          Yet within the opinion of FCC commissioners, polarization on the issue is evident and even Powell himself is concerned. When Congressman Ron Wyden (D) asks Powell, "... if he was concerned about the fact that one corporation, Clear Channel, has since 1996--when radio ownership rules were loosened--gone from owning a handful of stations to more than 1,200 nationally. Powell, who once claimed "the market is my religion," surprised everyone by answering, "Candidly, I am troubled.... I am concerned about media concentration, particularly in radio" (McChesney R. and J. 2003)." In fact the only persons at the meeting speaking in behalf of corporate radio, and in particular its presence in Minot, North Dakota, was Clear Channel CEO Lowry Mays and president Mark Mays (Shields T. 2003).

          Showcasing he LPFM By 2003 localism had become such an issue that in Powell launched the "Localism in Broadcasting Initiative" (Hay P. 2004) in which he states:: "I created the Localism Task Force to evaluate how broadcasters are serving their local communities. Broadcasters must serve the public interest, and the Commission has consistently interpreted this to require broadcast licensees to air programming that is responsive to the interests and needs of their communities"(Federal Communications Commission 2004).

Carrying on its interest in reinforcing localism the initiative endorses the emergence of a new kind of local radio station. Low powered FM (LPFM) stations were given licensed status in 2000 with their intent to "foster a fundamentally different kind of community radio service. These noncommercial educational stations serve neighborhoods, schools, churches, and niche audiences"(Federal Communications Commission 2004). The establishment of these non-commercial local stations produced a fire storm of controversy amongst established broadcasters over issues such as interference and and bandspace (National Association of Broadcasters 2000) [2000 #483]. The FCC puts the LPFM stations on notice that EAS decoders need to be in operation in their stations by 2002 (Federal Communications Commission 2000).

         To this point, deregulation continues at levels which some approve of and others disapprove. FCC Commissioner Copps states, "...the FCC is in the midst of a "watershed" debate over "whether to visit upon the rest of the broadcast media that which we have already visited upon radio--and much, much more" (McChesney R. and J. 2003). Responding to the dynamic of change in ownership rules Powell writes in USA Today:

"The time has come to honestly and fairly examine the facts of the modern marketplace and build rules that reflect the digital world we live in today, not the bygone era of black-and-white television. Joe Friday knew that only the facts would help him unravel a case. It is the same with this critically important FCC policy review. Only the facts will enable us to craft broadcast-ownership restrictions that ensure a diverse and vibrant media marketplace for the 21st century" (McChesney R. and J. 2003).

Powell's interest in localism is stated in the Localism Initiative:

"Our exhaustive ownership review demonstrated that the United States' boasts the most diverse media marketplace in the world and is by no means concentrated and the rules adopted in that proceeding are well-designed to prevent any media company from having excess power over competition or viewpoints. During the proceeding and in the months that followed, however, we heard the voice of public concern about the media loud and clear Localism is at the core of these concerns," Powell said, "and we are going to tackle it head on" (Federal Communications Commission 2004).

A Contrast in Findings In 2004 The National Transportation Safety Board found CPR negligent in the accident citing inadequate inspection and maintenance of its tracks (National Transportation Safety Board 2004). Since the accident hundreds of lawsuits have been filed against the Canadian Pacific Railway (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2004) (Associated Press 2004) (Associated Press 2004).
In the NTSB report 2004 it is noted that:

"After the accident, the Minot Police Department made emergency notifications to the public that included cable television interrupts, radio broadcasts, and outdoor warning sirens. However, many residents did not hear the emergency broadcasts because their homes had lost power as a result of the derailment. Additionally, residents of the houses in
the neighborhood closest to the derailment did not hear the outdoor warning sirens because the sirens are positioned to be heard within the city limits of Minot. The Minot Police Department attempted to contact the designated local emergency broadcast radio and television stations. At the time of the accident, only one person was working at the designated local emergency broadcast radio station (KCJB-AM), and the police department's calls to the station went unanswered. The designated local emergency broadcast television station (KMOT) did not have an overnight crew at the station. To
arrange emergency broadcasts, the police department had to contact the KMOT news director at his home" [p.17-18, 2004 #417].

However, if it was the Emergency Alert System (EAS) that was to be activated by the local Minot dispatch, calling KCJB radio on the telephone, or sending an aural message via two way radio, whether any one was there to get the message or not would not of activated the EAS. To activate the EAS system at the local level requires access to an encoder decoder which can directly link into the system at the LP1 (KCJB). Station manger Rick Stensby has confirmed this (Stensby R. 2004). John Funk, the area engineer in charge of KCJB at the time of the accident also states "This system (the EAS system at KCJB) was in place at the time of the minot event. We would do thunderstorms and tornado warnings all the time and it would work consistently. It was the fact that the police department didn't send anything. This did not work, because KCJB did not receive anything" (Funk B. 2005). In contrast, Nislow [2003 #420] reports that Minot police Chief Fred Debowey reasons that, "The signal was not received by the radio station, thus the alert could not be sent out automatically. Even if it had worked, said Debowey, the station would have not received it because their radio had the wrong crystal." Funk confirms that KCJB's receiver had the wrong crystal to receive the transmissions from the Minot police department. However the receiver referred to in this statement is not an EAS system, but rather part of a aural two-way radio system which had a communications link to KCJB's main studio. Funk states, "They were using it like it was still the EBS system. They weren't even using an endec, they were just getting on the radio and talking" (Funk B. 2005). The EAS system does not operate on voice commands. It requires an electronically encoded message from an endec for activation.
Given that the EAS system was clearly in use by the LP1 KCJB, nevertheless, Minot police 9 -11 dispatchers suggested to callers that they should "...tune to EBS system (television or radio) for more information" (Kris J., R. et al. 2002 p4).

EAS EBS, Clearing up the Confusion The analog-based Emergency Broadcast System, which was changed at KCJB to the digitally operated Emergency Alert System in 1997, and was prescribed by FCC rules as the accepted means of delivering an EAS, was not being evoked by the Minot police department the morning of the derailment.

Just weeks before this incident, with the same number of staff, Clear Channel's KCJB radio broadcast severe weather alerts from the National Weather Service, through the same (emergency radio response system) EAS box which was not activated on the night of the derailment. In fact those same EAS systems were in place before Clear Channel acquired these stations. In a discussion I had with Clear Channel Engineer Rick Stensby he stated:

"In 1997 the EAS system was put into all six of the stations here in Minot. That was before Clear Channel had bought the stations. There was one group and three were another group, both had put in that system and it has been operating since 1997. It replaced the emergency broadcast system (EBS) that was an old telephone system. That was done with the FCC. So our equipment was operating and working and was used on many occasions over the years, as it continues to be, by the National Weather Service and others for Tornado warnings and those types of things." (Stensby R. 2004)

In a report produced by Cornell University for the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the issue of corporate radio and in particular the corporation of Clear Channel radio, once again is viewed as the tantamount catalyst that introduces the failure of the EAS system in Minot.

"In at least one instance, Clear Channel's cost cutting practices have undermined public safety. In Minot ND. the lack of staffing at Clear Channel's radio stations impeded the activation of the emergency radio response system following a train derailment and a hazardous spill" (Figueroa M., R. et al. 2004).

The then and currently accepted "radio response system" is the digitally activated Emergency Alert System. The question should be asked, did the EAS system fail or was it even given a chance to fail? The Cornell study suggests the system failed because of "staffing at Clear Channel's radio stations". But an immediate problem arises with this rationale. Other than the official (human) required to activate the EAS system, the EAS system, unlike the EBS system requires no human input. Within the state and local emergency management plans, authority for actuation of the EAS might be given to a central state warning point, the National Weather Service, or a local official (if an encoder decoder is available). On the night of the derailment, if authorities could of gotten through to the staff of KCJB they still would not have been able to activate the EAS at the station because KCJB is not authorized to activate the system. It can receive and relay tests but at its EAS box but it cannot originate an EAS [2004 #363].

"At the time of the accident, Minot still had what it believed was an Operational Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) that would allow police to call up the local radio station and have it issue an emergency warning. The EBS was replaced in 1994 with the Emergency Alert System. Minot had both, Debowey told Law Enforcement News" (Nislow J. 2003). Thus, at the time of the derailment an operational endec was not in place at the Minot dispatching office. However, Minot officials did have alternative access points they could have used to activate the EAS system.

Activating an Emergency Radio Response At the time of the derailment Minot dispatch had access to the National Warning System (NAWAS) dispatch line. This aurally operated dedicated telephone line (Oak Ridge National Laboratories 2005) (Partnership for Public Awareness 2003) was housed at the Minot Warning Point and 9 -11 dispatch center and tied to state EAS access points such as the North Dakota state primary entry point for state radio in Bismarck and the National Weather Service in Bismarck. However, as Lt. Fred Debowey told this researcher in an interview they chose not to utilize this hot line because of the local nature of the event.

"We did have a hot line at the dispatch center but our decision not to use the National Warning System that morning was based on the idea that this was a local emergency. The anhydrous cloud was affecting Minot and some of the areas around it like Burlington and Surrey and we felt that by contacting the local radio station and putting out a warning through that means we could provide adequate warning. But nothing worked"[Debowey F., 2005 #514].

According to the state plan, the NAWAS phone line could have been engaged and a message sent to at least two entry points which in-turn could have activated the EAS. By sending a message to the NWS through NAWAS a Civil Emergency Message would of been issued that would of activated the in-studio EAS system at KCJB radio. In addition, State Radio could of been activated to trigger the EAS system located at KFYR radio in Bismarck and in-turn KFYR television in Bismarck would have also activated its system. KFYR television would then have activated KMOT TV its affiliate station in Minot. Funk states that "The problem was there was some markets like Minot, that were still going by the EBS rules and had no clue that any of this stuff had changed" (2005). Lieutenant Debowey agrees with this statement:

"But at the time of the derailment we were not aware that we could activate the National Weather Service with the hot line. No one had informed us that this was an option. Now we can contact the state primary entry point in Bismarck with the hot line and they can issue an alert to KFYR television in Bismarck which will activate all the stations in the Minot area" (Debowey F. 2005).

National Weather Warning Meteorologists John Paul Martin, in an interview with this researcher concurs that the NAWAS line would have been a viable alternative for Minot but adds:

"But a lot of times I think it comes down to in the heat of the battle, the average person will kind of forget about the resource in the national weather service that they have. I think a good thing that can come of all of this is, dispatchers, so to speak, at the warning points do not realize that they can go through the weather service and should go through the weather service to help in these matters. What I think we need to do is get on their procedures list, and you have this happen this is what you do. Somewhere on there has to be the option of calling the weather service and letting them know that they can send message" (Martin J. 2005).

Where Humans and Technology Meet Outside of the human interaction required for the decision to initiate its actuation, the EAS operates as a self-contained digital messaging system. The digitally advanced quality for these types of systems came with the transition from EBS to EAS (Runyon S. 1998). If the human responsibility is fulfilled in the process of initiating a message, apart from an electronic malfunction of the system, EAS is made to work digitally by itself. Paul Reynold, engineer for Cox Broadcasting, San Antonio, suggests that the "Credibility of the system is dependent on the ability of local officials to make it work. There is just too much "crying of wolf" and officials are not adhering to state plans" (Reynolds P. 2004).

Programming Versus Priorities The outcome of this component of this study suggests that the literature is confusing the programming of a radio station (KCJB) for the technical activation of a separate system (the EAS) within that radio station. Clearly, the Minot city police department attempted to activate an antiquated system. However, at the same time, KCJB radio still maintained that antiquated equipment (with an incorrect crystal). In contrasts KCJB also was fully compliant with FCC rules and regulations in maintaining their Emergency Alert System. The EAS system at KCJB worked, the antiquated two-way radio receiver at KCJB did not work. On the Minot police side, the antiquated two-way system seemed to work, but it could of never activated the EAS. The communications stalemate which ensued was a police department trying to contact a two-way radio on the wrong frequency so as to operate a system that would have not been accessible by these means. While at the same time, a perfectly operational EAS system at KCJB went idle.

          For whatever reason Minot Central Dispatch, could not contact the one employee working at KCJB radio by phone that morning, given the way the EAS works, Minot Central Dispatch should not have needed to contact KCJB by phone to activate the EAS system; and if it could of contacted anyone at KCJB, the station could not have activated its EAS system manually. There were alternative entry points into the system that were not accessed.

          Therefore, Clear Channel's staffing policy at KCJB has nothing to do with the in-activation of the EAS on the night of the derailment. Furthermore it is conjectural to suggest that if someone could have been contacted at the station that they would have been capable to put an announcement on the air. Clear Channel is completely within FCC rules and regulations to run its station unattended if it chooses. But none of these issues, although related to what the literature suggests is a consequence of the demise of localism, can be considered corollary to what happened with the non-use of the digital EAS system at KCJB. Minot Police Lt. Debowey suggests:

"As far as the communication system at the radio station goes I'm not blaming Clear Channel, there were responsibilities on both sides of this issue that were just not met, and when a breakdown in communications occurs like it did then there is going to be a real problem. All I want is assurances that even without anyone in that station we can still run an alert. Right now the monthly tests are quarterly and do not incorporate a full blown activation of the system that is, using other radio stations in the system. We are negotiating right now to try to make two monthly tests instead of just one because dispatchers really need the experience in activating this system and the other stations in the system do also" (Debowey F. 2005).

It is the finding of this research that something other than de-regulation played a role in producing the effect of the breakdown of the warning system in Minot. Rather, a combination of human issues, in particular, personnel training and cross-organizational communications, as well as a lack of organizational strategies and resources required to facilitate that training, was instrumental in the breakdown of this system. KCJB chief engineer Funk stated, "We'd never received anything from them to tells us that they had changed frequencies. I don't even think they knew that they were supposed to tell us that they changed. We had a set frequency receiver that couldn't be just tuned to another channel. We had to actually get it changed to another frequency" (Funk B. 2005). Conversely Lt. Fred Debowey suggests, "What I would tell other agencies, any dispatching facilities that have the responsibility to disseminate information through an emergency alert system is get to know your radio station" (Nislow J. 2003).

How does the EAS equate with emergency public service broadcasting?
What needs to clearly be delineated in the context of the Minot event or similar situations is the difference between how the EAS system functions and what the programming and broadcasting of emergency information is. The emergency alert system is a digital system, which has evolved from a lineage of similar national emergency alert systems, CONELRAD in the 1960s, and the emergency broadcasting system in the 1980. What is unique about EAS is its ability to be digitally controlled. In essence it is a system that can work around traditional systems which required more human control. Thus, in this current era of automated station operations, and robotically controlled stations, that by FCC approval operate without a human presence, the EAS system works well, as long as someone of an official capacity is there to activate the system.

           However, the EAS is limited to simply being an alerting system. In contrasts the service of emergency broadcasting goes well beyond the initial alerting phases. As Topping (Topping J. 2005) suggests, emergency service broadcasting may incorporate a wide range of personnel at a station who can provide critical information on survival. "A local broadcaster's most important role during an emergency situation is to stay on the air, if possible, and to provide people with the information they need to get through it. It is critical to plan what your station will do in the event of a disaster before the disaster strikes. The key to broadcasting through a crisis is getting people the information they need to get through themselves. That means broadcasting regular news and weather updates, as appropriate, and providing survival and safety information so people can cope" [2005 #485].

An example of emergency message broadcasting is provided in this research under Part VI EMERGENCY PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING AS A PROGRAMMING IDEAL observation. In that section it is shown how radio station KPQ in Wenatchee, Washington incorporates emergency message broadcasting as a part of their standard programming format. KPQ actually goes so far as to supplement the electronic EAS system by allowing local officials air time to provide critical information on local emergencies. This kind of activity is programming that goes beyond the simple access of an EAS system. In addition it is a choice that broadcasters make on behalf of their own station's programming format as to what might be aired or not aired on a station. There is much in the literature that suggests that local news programming is declining (Adler L. 1996) (Allen L. 1991) (Broadcasting Staff 1991) and conversely radio programming is becoming more and more homogenous and lacking in local content (Block V. 2002) (Bressers B. 2004). However, these issues do not impact the EAS system. Even robotically controlled stations can successfully use this system.

             The Paradox of the Un-funded Mandate In the context of local service the question could be asked to the general listening public, is the EAS enough? Interestingly, all that is required of a broadcaster with respect to the EAS is the carrying of the presidential announcement of a national emergency and the monthly tests (Federal Communications Commission 2002). "Under EAS, the stations that are even on auto forward they can pre-program to select what messages they will or will not bring forward. Under the regulations by the federal government, the only message that you have to carry is the message from Washington D.C. the rest of them you can ignore" (Gilbert M. 2005). Thus the broadcasting of weather alerts, Amber alerts, even terrorist alerts, products that all sent through the EAS, are delivered by broadcasters as announcements that go above and beyond the responsibilities of what the EAS legally necessitates. In essence, broadcasters that allow these kinds of alerts over their stations, through the EAS, (an unfunded mandate) are doing so at the expense of time, that would normally be sold. However, some stations, like KPQ Wenatchee, can capitalize on the emergency message/news market and go well beyond the level of providing just an EAS alert.

          Summary of Minot, North Dakota, Macdona, Texas and Graniteville South Carolina
The intent of this research was to look carefully at issues surrounding the activation of the EAS in Minot, North Dakota in 2001 and apply the findings of this model to other derailments. Since that time two other major derailments have occurred during the duration of this research. One in Macdona, Texas in 2004 and another in Grainteville South Carolina in 2005. These derailments were appropriate for this study in that both produced hazardous gas spills and required evacuations of local areas. The questions pursed in these comparisons was, how did the EAS system work in these venues, and what role did corporate radio play, if any, in providing the EAS and emergency messaging?

Minot North, Dakota The Canadian Pacific derailment at Minot occurred 18 January 2001 at 1:37 AM just west of downtown Minot, North Dakota. Of the 112 cars in this train (North Dakota Emergency Management 2003) twenty one cars derailed. Fifteen of the cars carried anhydrous ammonia; at least one ruptured and another developed a leak (North Dakota Emergency Management 2003). The event sent hundreds of people in Minot and the Ward County area to hospital and one death was blamed on the accident. Lawsuits emerged (Anonymous 2002) some of which are still in litigation
(Anonymous 2002) (Associated Press 2004).

          Many of the the early warning systems in place in Minot that morning broke down (National Transportation Safety Board 2004 p. 17-18). Analysis of this event in the literature has focused on these issues, especially the role radio and television played in disseminating an emergency alert. Furthermore the Cornell study and others have suggested that, with respect to the media, it is the current atmosphere of de-regulation and in particular, multiple ownership that has provided the modus for the breakdown of the operation of the EAS in Minot that morning (Figueroa M., R. et al. 2004) (McChesney R. and J. 2003) (Kidd D. 2004). However in a review of the Minot event, published by the National Transportation Safety Board none of the recommendations put forth relate to issues or problems that originate from the realities of multiple ownership radio clusters:

"Since the accident, the Minot Police Department has conducted meetings with the local telecommunications media to determine how the Minot Police Department (as the Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP)) can make faster contact with their respective organizations. According to the Minot Police Department, Minot Central Dispatch now has the phone numbers of key media staff of all Minot area stations.Additionally, the over-night person at KCJB-AM radio now carries a phone and an emergency broadcast system (EBS) pager so that the dispatchers can make immediate contact to six of the seven radio stations in Minot by making one call" (Kris J., R. et al. 2002 p.24)

This research has confirmed that the recommendations set forth by the NTSB relate more to the procedural mechanics of activating the EAS than the policies of the FCC on multiple ownership. In addition, the staffing practices of Clear Channel KCJB radio (Kidd D. 2004) has nothing to do with the automated activation of the EAS. It has been confirmed by this research that had the single board operator attending KCJB that morning had been presenthe would have not been able to activate the EAS from KCJB. In addition, if the operator had not been present civil authorities could have still activated the EAS had they had the training and equipment to do so.

          Nevertheless, the derailment at Minot has become the model by which to measure the apparent decline in broadcast localism (Anonymous 2004). However, if the EAS is an essential component of the public warning system, then analysis of what happened in Minot, which does not consider the documented breakdown of human interaction with a digital electronic system, is dangerously missing the point. As is further understood by the inquiries of the Macdona, Texas and Grainteville, South Carolina derailments, it is human interaction, not de-regulation that becomes the issue in disseminating a warning through the EAS.

Macdona, Texas A detailed study of the derailment of 28 June 2004 at Macdona, Texas can be found in Appendix 1 of this research. In the derailment incident at Macdona Texas this researcher, through interviews with individuals at radio stations within the San Antonio (EAS) area and the originating source for a CEM, the National Weather Service in San Marcos, Texas, found that the EAS system during this event was never activated. This was also confirmed through interviews with officials of the Environmental Protection Agency in Dallas, Texas, (Harris S. 2004).

         The plume of chlorine and ammonium nitrate gas from the accident impacted areas on the southern edge of San Antonio about fourteen miles to the northeast. At Sea World amusement park "...six people were treated for minor respiratory irritation" (CNN 2004). Three people died in this incident which involved the Burlington Northern and Union Pacific Railway (Mason S. 2004).

         Immediately following the incident, this researcher contacted the National Weather Service in New Braunfels, Texas. In a phone interview with Bill Runyon data acquisition program manager, and John Zeiter science and operations officer I was informed that the NWS did not issue a CEM and could only do so if authorized by a emergency manager (Runyon B. 2004). In contacting the local LP1 WOAI and LP2 KKYX in San Antonio as well as a series of other stations in the area, it was found that no EAS was issued to any of these stations. However, in almost every case any radio station that had a news department could hear emergency scanner traffic. With this information, emergency message broadcasting was delivered by Clear Channel Broadcasting WOAI and Cox Broadcastings KKYX-AM.

         The Macdona incident is an example of corporate radio carrying emergency messaging broadcasts as a supplement to an EAS announcement that was never delivered. The problem at Macdona, Texas was found to be similar in nature to what happened in Minot, North Dakota in that an EAS was never issued, either at the local, county, or state level. Ironically by default, robotics stations in the San Antonio market that could have delivered an EAS message electronically, did not do so because the initiation of the process did not begin at the local emergency management level (Becerra A. 2004). In addition to no EAS activation the Environmental Protection Agency reports that a community alert telephone network was never activated and "The decision not to go forward with the alert was never relayed back to the Incident Commander, who continued to operate under the assumption that the notification was in progress" (Mason S. 2004 p.9). In this case perhaps radio delivered the only immediate information to the public about this event. In particular it was the news departments of corporate owned radio stations, Clear Channel broadcasting WOAI and Cox Broadcasting KKYX, San Antonio, Texas that broadcast the first alerts of the emergency based on information derived from scanner reports (see Appendix I).

          Graniteville South Carolina Appendix V of this research discusses the derailment of another freight train heading north near Graniteville, South Carolina. This incident at occurred at about 2:40 in the morning on 6 January 2005. The accident released chlorine gas and killed nine people, injured approximately 250 and caused the evacuation of over 5000 people (National Transportation and Safety Board 2005).

           Although this incident occurred at 2:40 A.M. it was not until about three hours later at 5:40 am when an EAS was delivered. The EAS system was activated but as in the case of Macdona, Texas (and ultimately with Minot) emergency message broadcasting was delivered aside from an official EAS alert. This research found the delay in delivery of the EAS to be human error. The local LP1 and LP2 stations for this region are in Augusta Georgia. Both of these stations, WBBQ and WYZA are controlled by Clear Channel Broadcasting.

           It is important to note that although these stations had not received an EAS actuation they were already on the air broadcasting emergency information to those people impacted by the event just across the state line in Graniteville. It was Clear Channel's engineer, Earl Welsh and his assistant who determined why there was no EAS activation for the Augusta/Aiken area during the event. Welsh stated in an interview with this researcher that the NWS transmitter
WBBQ was monitoring (Wrens, GA) was not the transmitter to which the EAS actuation from the NWS was being sent (Aikens, SC). Once the signal was transferred from the other NWS transmitter to the local transmitter at Wrens Georgia, (the one that WBBQ and WYZA were monitoring) the EAS came through fine (Welsh E. 2005). National Weather Service Warning Coordinator Meteorologist Steve Naglic stated that:

"It (the EAS) was re-sent to the Wrens transmitter WXK-54. We continued to transmit the EAS on the Aiken Transmitter WNG 627. The only reason it went to Wrens was that's what BBQ monitored. Aiken transmitter is the primary transmitter for Aiken county, but because of the EAS activation we forgot to link Aiken county on the Wrens transmitter for EAS activation. Because of that, actually there were two counties that had to be fixed that were not linked to our LP1 stations" (Naglic S. 2005).

In the Graniteville case it was human error that produced the inertia that lent to the delay in the delivery of this alert, not the ability for the technology to perform. In addition, it was corporate radio (Clear Channel) station clusters in Augusta, Georgia that supplemented the local service lost by virtue of the late delivery of an EAS. News reports and live emergency message programming from these corporate radio broadcasters filled in the public service gap.

When the EAS Doesn't Work In the inquiries produced by this research of the derailments at Macdona, Texas, and Graniteville, South Carolina, (events which have emerged naturally in the progress of this research) robust similarities exist with that of Minot. First, the EAS system was never activated or it was activated late in the sequence of the course of events. Next, there was a presence of corporate radio stations at each of these events. Last, training, planning, and cross-departmental communications emerges as an issue impacting the dissemination of the EAS.

           Analyzing these issues this research concludes that, the establishment of corporate radio and the de-regulated broadcast environment is not a factor in the anomalies found in the dissemination of the EAS in all three of these events. In fact it was corporate radio, Clear Channel included, that assisted the EAS system in Macdona, Texas and Graniteville, South Carolina by providing emergency message broadcasting, outside the scope of the EAS. In both of these events, corporate radio supplanted the non-existing or late warnings of the EAS. In contrast even in Minot, although later in the sequence of events, KCJB radio did go on the air and provided emergency message broadcasting. (However, it should be noted that the literature focuses the issue in Minot on the initial activation of the EAS system, not on late newscasts about the event).

          As in the case of Macdona, Texas and early on in Graniteville, South Carolina the EAS was not activated. In the Minot event, there was no activation of the EAS. As in all three of these events that activation would have originated from, local authorities through a state or local network. Ironically, the EAS systems at robotically controlled stations in San Antonio would have been activated, as well as the EAS system residing in the (inaccessible by telephone) KCJB studio; if an authorized activation would have occurred. Those activations never came.

          The anomalies in the dissemination of the EAS in all three of these derailments point to issues surrounding the preparedness of emergency managers and their ability to interact with other agencies as well as with radio stations. In addition the ability to have access to an utilize EAS technology and its network are critical issues surrounding these incidents. All of these issues exist aside from the environment of de-regulated broadcasting.

What role does localism play within the scope of the EAS?
Appendix II of this study reviews the Media Security and Reliability Survey data derived from a survey conducted in 2003 by this committee. In part IV the survey data is looked at naturalistically from the perspective of two broad area themes:

Theme 1 Spatial Geographic Connections; geographic linking of stations within the chain of stations.

Theme 2 Relations within the local programming area; needs dealing with the local human interface.

These themes were derived from Newton's dualistic model of localism which adapted the idea of localism being defined by both the geographic distribution of stations and the local programming needs of the communities in which they reside (Newton G. 1995). The MSR survey was analyzed to draw these themes out from the responses of emergency managers and others collected in the survey.

          Of theme number one: Seventy seven percent of the statements made within these responses reflect issues associated with poor reception of the EAS signal, weak linkages between stations and problems with the distribution of the audio signal quality.

          Of theme two: The subcategory of Participation by Local Authorities generated a response by 46% of those surveyed. Some of the issues raised included: Getting help from various state agencies, establishing civil authority, and the commitment and participation of state police. Political isolationism and egos were also blamed for problems within committees.

          The comments melded into these themes were from both a negative and positive perspective. Thus, what is suggested by this analysis is that localism, as defined by this segment of this research, is evident in issues that surround broadcasters dealing with the emergency alert system and ancillary local systems that surround it. However, the limitation to this analysis is that it draws from a succinct operational definition of localism.

Local Access and ENDEC Technology To follow up with the notion that local access to an EAS is an important part of the protocol in providing the EAS warning, this research considered a sample of radio stations and their connectivity to local activation authorities through the use of a encoder decoder (endec). In examining the Minot event it is clear that the use of and access to an endec is a critical component in understanding why an EAS could not be sent.
Appendix III of this research contains data derived from a sample of 27 radio stations selected from towns similar in size to Minot North Dakota and a selection of some towns outside that range. All of these communities are adjacent to major rail lines and highways. An official of selected radio stations in each community was contacted and interviewed for this survey by phone. Each individual was asked a set of questions that pertained to local level EAS activation issues.
Thus, a key question in this survey was, does your county OEM have ENDEC capabilities? Eighty percent of all the respondents said there was no local activation capabilities at their stations. Six of the stations sampled were LP1s and of these stations, three had endec capabilities. In addition, some of these cited problems with the delivery of the endec signal and the training of personnel on the emergency management side.
More study is needed to understand the relationship of this data. However, if local access for local emergencies is important then endec systems and training in the use of these systems should become more available.

          The technology of radio broadcasting is changing dramatically. The EAS has been a part of those changes. Harris suggests that, "Today's technology consumer devours lots of different media, and that has taken the luster away from some old-fashioned information stalwarts namely AM/FM radio" (Harris R. 2005). The delivery of the EAS system is based around the old "stalwarts" of radio. However, its digital structure gives it a chameleon like character which allows it to reside in many other forms of media, such as cell phones, the internet, pagers, and weather radio to name a few. The term used to define this kind of system is an integrated warning system (Anonymous 2002). The Partnership for Public Warning advocates this kind of ubiquitous adaptation (Lemos R. 2002) (Partnership for Public Awareness 2004).Some of this change is already taking effect. In 2004 NOAA Weather Radio was given the title as All Hazards Radio and now even "terror warnings will soon be added to an expanded weather radio network" (Associated Press 2004).

          Although the Emergency Alert System can be integrated into a wide range of communication devices the PPW cautions that "Public Warning is a system- not a technology. Developing an effective public warning system is a complex process that requires the integration and management of many different elements. Selecting a technology to disseminate warnings is often the easiest issue to address, as there are many excellent technologies and systems available. Moreover, a comprehensive public warning system will employ a multitude of technologies" (Partnership for Public Awareness 2004). In an FCC notice of proposed rule making regarding the use of integrated technologies, the Rehabilitation Engineering Research Center on Telecommunications Access (RERC-TA) states:

"The key to effective public warning lies not in perfecting one system or technology, but in using all available means of communication in a coordinated and effective way. Most people use different modalities and technologies for receiving communication and information, depending on the situation and their location at the time.The ability to be flexible in modality is critically important to alerting people with disabilities. It will also alert more of the general population faster, with fewer people ending up misinformed because they have heard third- or fourth-hand information" (Vanderheiden G., J. et al. 2004).

Emergency management officials in Minot have learned this the hard way and now have a redundant system in place that incorporates a community alert network through the phone lines (City of Minot 2004), sirens, the EAS, and regular training drills (Debowey F. 2004). Minot Police Lt. Fred Debowey stated that "There is no longer any need for someone to be at the radio station when an emergency message comes through, as long as the station, Minot's KCJB, has its emergency alert equipment forwarding the signal automatically. And should the station go down, said Debowey, the department has a hotline to the state capital in Bismarck, the National Weather Service, and North Dakota State Radio" (Nislow J. 2003). But he cautions that even with state-of-the-art technology the human factor cannot be overlooked. "Training is essential for dispatchers and people on the radio side. Radio stations need to get to know their local emergency management people and it is critical that the emergency management people need to get familiar with their media outlets" (Debowey F. 2005).

Limitations To This StudyThis study looked only at the emergency alert system in the context of its delivery through radio with respect to railroad derailments. The survey of stations conducted in Appendix III concentrated on small communities around the size of Minot North Dakota, where the derailment model evolved from for this research.
Although in view of the many new emerging technologies that could deliver an EAS message, radio still, by virtue of its ubiquity of use and its simplicity is still a very viable means of delivering the EAS. Radio is still the preferred means of keeping in touch with the outside world during an emergency. Every emergency management agency recommends that a battery radio be a part of shelter supplies. Practically every automobile has a radio and every home has multiple radios. But in the current programming environment what good might a radio become if while in your shelter all you can hear are talk shows fed by satellites from a distant city, or perhaps nothing at all since the station you would be listening to was off the air with no generator. In order for the technology of the EAS to work, indeed, in order for emergency message broadcasting to work there needs to be a commitment on behalf of the broadcasters in an area who consider the threats of natural and human disasters seriously.

Compounded Problems In Operations and Its Impact on EAS There is a problem in radio today. With de-regulation has come a limited FCC inspection staff. In the Pacific Northwest two FCC inspector cover 75 counties in the Washington and Oregon state region (Nguyen B. 2004). Appendix IV of this study gives examples of poor broadcasting practice that have been monitored over a period of three years. This sample includes numerous examples of both problems in operation and practice as well as technical breakdowns. In one of these instances this researcher filed a complaint with the FCC. Following the complaint, and subsequent follow ups no action was taken. Radio Broadcast Engineer Ralph Evans, owner of Evans and Associates, suggests that poor operating practice and maintenance is on the rise (Evans R. 2000).

"Almost every one of the stations that test...we find more and more screwed up stations... and that used to be a small fraction of the cases. The U.S. AM broadcast system was the best in the world, absolutely bar none, probably now that is no longer the case. There is nobody watching the owners that used to watch the store because they were professional broadcasters, number one and number two the FCC was looking over their shoulder and they used to keep things together." Groups today are buying facilities like oranges in a bucket, they don't care about them individually they only care about the package, when they sell the air time.... this gets you 100 markets and this is the cost and no one is looking at the individual market" (Evans R. 2003).

Placing this issue into the arena of the delivery of the EAS is not difficult. In one case cited in Appendix IV an LP1 was found to be off the air for hours at a time. In one instance the station went off the air for the whole weekend. The engineer of the station was not to be found, the owners were not to be found, and when this researcher questioned the local director of emergency management the following weekday, she assured me she had no idea that the station was off the air that long, yet she admitted that she should have been told.
But in the context of the EAS, a whole team of broadcasters and emergency managers must be motivated to make it work. Lonnie Shurtleff chief engineer for KCMB in La Grande Oregon sums up the problem with the common denominator of people.

"If the entities involved other than broadcasters would pick up their end of the stick the situation is solved. The whole point of the EAS was to recognize that lots of times stations are not manned now days and so anyone like emergency management people are supposed to have an endec installed wherever they choose to, wherever they choose their operation center to be. That whole part of the scenario around here has never happened. We have had a lot of heart burn about this EAS system. The system itself can be made to work, but it always comes back to people" (Shurtleff L. 2004).

Oregon Public Broadcasting state relay network coordinator Everett Helm in an interview expressed a more pessimistic perspective.

"Probably In this day and age it is very difficult to think of anything that is so widespread that you would have a nationwide activation. I don't think the system works. I think unfortunately that by the time the system was in place, and as usual it was an unfunded mandate from the government, which was only partially mandated....as usual they dumped the onus of building the systems on the broadcasters, with no functionality design or funding to back it up. They put minimal pressure on the cable systems and nothing that the satellite providers have to do, and the local emergency agencies, were totally left high and dry and yet they are the most critical aspect.

 

Meantime the broadcasters had this tight deadline in which we had to install all this equipment, most of which still does not work properly, and we are just now in the last year or two really starting to bring some of these emergency operation centers up on line.

Here in Portland, Washington County, Clark County and Clackamas county can originate alerts. The broadcasters are really only conduits. They should not be originating these things. In Union county right now if you needed to generate an alert, the only choice that you have is to have someone at the Sheriffs Office call the LP 1 on the telephone and have them send a message to the other stations in the system. And hopefully all the stations in that area are monitoring that LP1 and are going to re-generate it or re-transmit it.

There are religious broadcasters in town that have translators that come out of Twin Falls Idaho, and they are not required to have an EAS unit. Someone may be watching satellite TV and they are not required to have an EAS unit.

Almost every time we do a test it doesn't work in a variety of different ways. Sometimes the audio does not get in there properly and get transferred through the system. The FIPS codes are wrong, sometimes someone forgets to hit the end of message button. I mean it goes on an on. Here in Multinomah county we had a person in the Multinomah county 911 center start playing with box, thinking that they was leaning how to use it and testing it; and instead of sending test messages that don't go anywhere, they put out three Amber alerts, realizing they had sent out the alerts, on top of that then they sent out an alert that said that that this wasn't an alert Which also goes against that state plan. It's just fraught with confusion.

What I think we should do, like I said the system was obsolete by the time it came out, even then there were a lot of mom and pop radio stations, hard to find now, complaining about the expense of buying a box, which the government is forcing you to do. In this day and age, we should be using a combination of using data over cell, data over pagers, we should be sending out a data transport stream out of the radio stations that goes to an EAS unit, that completely regenerates everything. We are well at the level now where someone in Salem should be able to type a message into a computer terminal saying, we are putting out an alert for a chemical hazard which is spreading across the state. Every box should be able to take that text and say it. That way every single box has first generation audio and that way any one can understand it instead of it trying to relay the same scratchy audio that was relayed across the state somewhere"(Helm E. 2004).

         Greg McDonald, President of the Montana Broadcasters Association, also reflects the attitude that emergencies are generally local events and most do not even require state wide activation. After years of patching together relays, in a state where mountains cut off and isolate large regions, McDonald is now waiting for the approval of a much simpler, straight forward state emergency communications plan. Using the existing NWS radio system, its focus is local and regional (McDonald G. 2005).

Stark EAS Realities Helms statement regarding "nationwide activation" is a cogent thought when one considers the number of times the EAS system has been activated at the nationwide level....never. McDonald reports that, "...about 1,000 local alerts a year are transmitted over the system; nearly 80 percent are generated by the National Weather Service, primarily in the 'Tornado Alley' of the Midwest and the hurricane-prone states of the Gulf Coast" (McConnell B. 2004). But during, the Northridge Earthquake, The Eruption of Mount Saint Helens, and the attack on the World Trade Center and The Pentagon, there was no activation. For an understanding of this McConnel and Trigoboff cite Richard Rudman, director of engineering for KFWB (AM) Los Angeles and head of the FCC's Emergency Alert System National Advisory Council's Coordinating Council for Local Stations:

"There was no identifiable major threat to the entire country," said Richard Rudman, director of engineering for KFWB (AM) Los Angeles and head of the FCC's Emergency Alert System National Advisory Council's Coordinating Council for Local Stations. At the national level, the system was designed for the president to talk to the people, if all other means of communications didn't work. It could be argued that the president was out of touch for awhile on Sept. 11. But had the president needed to talk to the public, he wouldn't have needed the EAS" (McConnell B. and D. Trigoboff 2001).

Furthermore Rudman, EAS National Advisory Chairman for the FCC states in e-mail sent to the Idaho EAS PEPAC pep list serve gave this rationale for why the EAS was not activated on 9-11.

"There have been many questions on the line bulletin boards, directly to the FCC as well as directly to me as the FCC EAS NAC Chair and to other NAC appointees as to why EAS was not invoked on Tuesday. If there is a short answer, it is a variation of the one I gave when I was asked why the old EBS was not used when the Northridge earthquake hit Los Angeles in 1994. Some events really do serve as their own alerts and warnings. Everyone in fact was alerted to the rapidly changing situation and rapidly became glued to a radio or TV. An emergency warning should be designed to accomplish at
least that simple but important goal. In fact, what ramped up rapidly and very successfully was the massive effort to tell the rapidly unfolding and changing story of the emergency as accurately as possible. The record will show that the local and federal government and media partnerships developed over the years worked, and worked very, very well. Due to time of day and many other factors, it is not clear to me at this time if any type of EAS activation on Tuesday would have served any useful purpose. In fact, my friends in the emergency management community and specialists on emergency public information would probably agree with me that an EAS warning without adequate information to support would be worse than no warning at all.

 

o We know from experience that information developed in the early stages
of any emergency is often wrong.
o The normal means to deliver breaking news at all levels and get
officials on the air were all very much intact.
o There were issues of national security at stake that had to be factored
in by those "in charge" of the emergency at the federal level.

With the benefit of hindsight, NOT using EAS was a good judgement call, even at the local/civil EAS levels. We truly believe using EAS would have resulted in greater anxiety and uncertainty ­exactly what we did not need on
Tuesday. When the threat is not quantified, what do you tell people to do to protect themselves? The answer is that sometimes a warning can make things worse. Based on what I know at this point, that would have been the
case on Tuesday. We will be learning a lot from the lessons of Tuesday that go far beyond EAS. Are EAS warnings justified for some types of terrorist activities? The answer is "yes." Silent hazards to life, health and safety that do not announce themselves are one category I can think of. The FCCs EAS National Advisory Committee (NAC) I chair has a subcommittee in place for more than a year that is looking at ways to build on the EAS infrastructure to create an advanced warning system. The goal is to have the capability to reach out to people who need and want emergency information -- even those who are not tuned in to radio or TV. In fact, the goal of a truly advanced warning system should be to get everyone
to monitor the breaking news situation -- literally the story of the emergency.

We are breaking new ground here ­ ground we never hoped to be standing on. Long term, the EAS protocol can support far more than we have asked it to support so far. EAS can and will be adapted to provide better warnings for the general public as well as the sight and hearing impaired. It ultimately will let warnings awaken from a sound sleep those of us who choose that option. To sum up, I submit that our entire emergency public information delivery system worked very well on Tuesday" (Rudman R. 2001).

         It should also be noted that by the 18 September 2001 EAS routine monthly tests of the national EAS were suspended. FEMA primary entry point project manager Timothy Putprush, in an e-mail sent the to the Idaho EAS PEPAC pep list serve stated the necessity of this suspension:

1) THE PUBLIC MAY MISINTERPRET THE EAS TEST FOR A REAL EVENT,
2) EMOTIONS ARE RUNNING VERY HIGH AT THIS TIME, WE NEED TO PROVIDE A CALMING INFLUENCE,
3) SHOULD THE EAS NEED TO BE ACTIVATED, AT ANY LEVEL, THE CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION NEED TO BE AVAILABLE TO CARRY EMERGENCY TRAFFIC NOT TEST MESSAGES (Tharp J. 2001).

 

In contrast, in 2004, the FCC issued a "...Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) concerning the Emergency Alert System (EAS), seeking comment on how EAS can be improved to be a more effective mechanism for warning the American public of an emergency. The action stems in part from recommendations of the Media Security and Reliability Council (an FCC Advisory Committee), and the Partnership for Public Warning" (Federal Communications Commission 2004).

Is there a Need for a National Warning System?
             If Rudman's suggestion that the EAS was not activated on 9-11 because the networks handled the situation adequately then the question could be posed, 'is there really a need for an national alert system at all?' Given Rudman's position that the EAS was not needed on 9-11, McConnell and Trigoboff raise questions:

"...not only of relevance but of redundancy. As FCC Chairman Michael Powell noted in a radio interview last month, "The explosion of 24-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week media networks, the unbelievable ubiquity of coverage in some ways has proven to supplant those original conceptions of a senior leader's need to talk to the people. ... This sort of ubiquitous media environment and culture that we live in really provides pretty valuable vehicles for our leadership to communicate with the citizenry, short of the Emergency Alert System" (McConnell B. and D. Trigoboff 2001).

It is the position of this researcher that the EAS system as it exists presently is not a fully functional system at the local level. Problems exists between local public authorities and the radio stations that they must be integrated with. At the national level the system is "tested" every month, but pragmatically there is no evidence that suggests the system in itself is flawless. There is a need for a system tied to regional and state designs. Given its history, the EAS is not been used at the national level and given the local character of hazards both human and natural, a great deal of burden could be lifted from local broadcasters if a redesign of this system could take place from the bottom up. That re-design should include a commitment to balanced funding.

Closing Comments This study looked only at the application of the EAS through the use of commercial radio. However, given radio's ubiquity amongst the public, its simple use, and its ability to provide immediate information, the power of this medium to deliver the EAS should not be overlooked. In addition when broadcasters choose to, their stations as well as their listening audience benefit from providing timely, accurate emergency messages. This kind of public service is being accomplished even within the current atmosphere of de-regulation.

         Radio still plays a vital role in the dissemination of emergency messages and the facilitation of the EAS. However to suggest that the EAS system is a fully functional system is like saying an automobile with bald tires, a bad carburetor and a leaking radiator is a drivable car. Clearly, there are problems with the system. But these problems existed pre and post de-regulation, and although the system as a technology is gaining stability with time, it is its human administration that this study has found to be the issue. Complex state plans, ambiguous monitoring assignments, and indeed the affective component of people committing time and energy to the effort of making this system work all play a role in its effective delivery.

           Foremost, this study revealed the issues surrounding the operation of the EAS has little to do with the nature of de-regulation and the new localism, and has much to do with the human factors inherently a part of any system such as this. In fact the digital EAS system is very much at home in an unattended studio.

           Emergency message broadcasting and the emergency alert system are important components to a community wide self-defensive initiative. Managers in smaller market radio stations and emergency managers with proclivities toward the perception that "it can't happen here so who cares" should seriously re-consider their paradigm. Terrorist activity focused toward rural areas, smaller communities and "soft targets" is a potential reality (Jordan L. 2005) (Council of Foreign Relations 2005) (CNN 2002).

           Although NOAA and National Weather Service radio will now carry terrorist alerts, it will be broadcast radio stations that will carry the brunt of the delivery of information to the general public; information such as evacuation routes and how to survive. In addition to terrorist strikes other natural disasters require that the public be prepared to communicate its needs in times of need, radio can and has assisted in this need. However, the radio side can only function if all involved with the emergency process establish sound goals and directives and work together seriously.

           As for the technology of the digital emergency alert system, it is as much at home in a small town's unattended automated studio, as it is in a low powered FM station, or bolted to the communications rack of a corporate cluster broadcaster. By itself the digital EAS is localism.

Equity of load Radio stations are only conduits for emergency messages. They are mandated by law to carry these messages or at least have the equipment to do so, if the messages ever come. Most do so with little hesitance. However, state and local authorities have no requirement to use these stations. Granted the nature of both these functions are different, but the bottom line is if the resource of the radio station is to be used to communicate to the public then those that authenticate the messages for that use need to be equipped to know what is expected of them. Engagement of both the media and local authorities into a cooperative working relationship is critical to making the local plan work. Minot Police Lt. Fred Debowey suggests:

"Everybody believes that emergency services is the police and the fire response but its not. Their is a third, and that is the radio media. We all provide an equal share of the responsibility of transmitting communications to the public. When somebody says. 'it's the police department or the dispatch centers responsibility to get the word out. I don't agree with that. What I do agree with is that we all share an equal burden in ensuring that the public is notified when an emergency happens. The only way to do that is by everybody getting together and saying we have an emergency and this is how we can get the message out. It's emergency services, police fire and the emergency management office, but an integral part of this communications chain is the media"(Debowey F. 2005).

Assessment, Drill, and Training Assess your hazards at both the local and regional levels. Bring in geologists, climatologists, geographers, planners, sociologists, historians and review the possibilities for disasters. Establish the geographic dimensions of your regions and local service areas around the potentials for local and regional disasters. For example forest fires can have a regional character. In those regions make sure that communications networks can be developed with that regional breadth in mind. Local, and regional drills that incorporate the actual operation and test of the EAS is crucial. Operation Heartland Defense (Springer D. 2004) is an example of scenario based drill which incorporated local commercial communications groups. Chris O'Hearn engineer for Family Radio Incorporated La Crosse, Wisconsin, a participant in the Heartland Defense drill, suggests that the county needs to have a clear understanding what the local radio station can provide and how to get in contact with personnel at the station (O'Hearn C. 2004).

          Training is component discussed in the FCCs 2004 notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) concerning the EAS stating:
"Some broadcasters and cable operators state that the EAS system and equipment are difficult to learn and use during actual emergencies and that the infrequent use of the equipment results in staff members being unable to remember how to use it when necessary. Additionally, lack of EAS training for emergency management personnel is a concern"(Federal Communications Commission 2004).

          Lt. Debowey agrees that training on both the emergency management side and the radio side is essential. "Radio stations need to get to know their local emergency management people and it is critical that the emergency management people need to get familiar with their media outlets"[2005 #514]. However, equally important who should provide and pay for this training? Prior to de-regulation, the FCC provided testing for a series of personal licenses required to operate a broadcast station. At the basic 3rd Class Endorsed broadcast license these tests included questions on the then active EBS system (Federal Communications Commission 1976). Although some sort of formal training in the use of the equipment is vital, weekly and monthly testing can assist in providing experience to operators. Training combined with testing the system is a critical aspect of KPQ radio's integration of the EAS into their station. KPQ engineer Pete Peterson suggests, "We are going to participate with the EAS board to do training, test the system, and trouble shoot the system. The attitude of this radio station is that, we're here for the public and by serving the public we will benefit"(Media Security and Reliability Council 2003).

Design the system from the bottom up Focus on local issues. The evidence is clear, a national level warning system has never been used. However the EAS as well as the EBS system has been activated numerous times for local emergencies (McConnell B. 2004) (Poulsen K. 2004). Tornadoes, earthquakes, forest fires, derailments, terrorist attacks, are local, not national events. Bottom-up planning is a much more logical perspective in a system that is made to serve a locality or region. Furthermore it is much easier to test the system at lower levels before tieing them into upper levels. It is much easier to build at the local level first then slowly redesign the lower levels so they fit more readily into the upper end of the network. This approach is much more reasonable for individuals at the lower levels as well. To amass a complete system all at once and then try to make it fit is much more difficult especially when the problems that the system addresses is local.

           The National Weather Service NOAA weather radio, all hazards radio system is becoming a simple and effective way to structure a local network. National Weather service warning coordinator John Paul Martin suggest "This is where the all hazards approach to weather radio comes in. NOAA weather radio is really now NOAA weather radio all hazards radio. What it allows is emergency managers at the state level, to request that we, the National Weather Service send a message out for them" [2005 #500]. For example, the Washington State plan states that, "NOAA/NWS is fully integrated into the system, so event's that were not originated by NWS are still routed through their transmitters" (Tharp J. 2004). In addition not only can radio stations use the NWS as a monitoring point for their EAS, but conversely the public can hear NOAA weather radio with dedicated receivers. These receivers are becoming more available and in the direction of alternative public alert and warning systems the frequency of NWS radio is being integrated into other receiver types as well.

            Finally, to insure viability of the system state plans should be simple, understandable, and accessible. This will allow for better participation of broadcasters in the system.

LAST UPDATE 7:39 PM 26 April 2005
6:30 28 April 2005 My daughter told me she has a baby on the way.