The EAS Electronic Interface with Localism At its most basic level the EAS is composed of local radio stations (Newton G. 1995) electronically linked together within a spatial matrix of stations at the national, state, and local levels. Each of these areas constitutes a nodal region (Abler R., Adams et al. 1971) of stations. Within each region a few primary stations (nodes) pass emergency messages on to other stations (nodes) within the region. The term 'daisy chain' is sometimes used to describe this kind of network (Media Security and Reliability Council 2003). The daisy chain passes messages along in linear fashion from one station to another. This has been shown to be problematic in that in some cases fewer than half of the messages have been found to "make it to the end of the daisy chain" (Texas Association of Broadcasters 2003). However, the new technology of the EAS system allows for expanded connections to outside source messages. By allowing a radio station to receive messages from numerous sources, the newer EAS Web Architecture can dramatically mitigate the daisy chain aspect of the system , so as to increase the chances of a station receiving a message (Behno T. 2003 p. 264). In Washington State the EAS matrix is structured as follows:

 

"1. Broadcasters are not expected to originate messages, they just relay them. Government agencies originate all EAS messages at both the State and Local levels. LP1 & LP2 stations may not be manned, but their equipment will still relay the proper alerts automatically.
2. EAS messages pass through the network in the background and stay in the background as much as possible. What is called a daisy chain of broadcast stations is avoided except for backup.
3. NOAA/NWS is fully integrated into the system, so events that were not originated by NWS are still routed through their transmitters"(Tharp J. 2004).

With the system acting as a web rather than a linear chain, O'Hearn suggests that "you can lose various parts of the system and still have, as long as people are following the various recommendations and are committed to serving their community, some larger links fail and still have a pretty robust system"
(O'Hearn C. 2004).

           The EAS Human Interface with Localism Richard Wilson, retired radio engineer, who has worked with the Oregon State system suggests that, when the EBS changed to EAS, all the broadcasters got involved in good faith and purchased equipment. But when it came down to the OEMs (offices of emergency management) they were reluctant to participate suggesting that it was too much trouble and a liability to generate emergency action notifications. ENDEC systems were not put in and the system which required the support of OEM on state plans quickly broke down. (Wilson R. 2004). Although EAS is a completely digital and automated system, human error in its operation can be a problem (Chartrand S. 1993) (Steffler A. 2004). Some broadcasters suggest that actuations of the EAS are too numerous and cause too much disruption of programming, (Reynolds P. 2004) (Mulligan T. 2004) (Carpenter E. 2004). In contrast, in the derailments incidents at Minot, North Dakota and Macdona, Texas, the EAS system was not activated as a result of human error (The Information Policy Institute, Tele-Information et al. 2003) (Harris S 2004) (Becerra A. 2004). "We have had a lot of heart burn about this EAS system. The system itself can be made to work, but it always comes back to people" (Shurtleff L. 2004). Incumbent upon the system to work is the human network of emergency management officials, (those individuals from which EAS messages originate) and the broadcasters who deliver these messages to the public.

         Contrasting the EAS With Public Service Programming A mainstay of public service programming is news which can be used to supplement emergency information to the public. In 2004 the FCC demonstrated its concern for the operation of the EAS at the national and local levels by isuing a notice of inquiry which focused on defining the EAS in the context of localism.

"A fundamental way in which broadcasters use the medium to serve their communities of license is to provide emergency information. The Commission's role in ensuring that broadcasters fulfill this obligation is set forth in section 1 of the Act, which declares that the Congress created the Commission "for the purpose of promoting safety of life and property through the use of wire and radio communication. Beyond EAS, however, broadcast stations often voluntarily provide emergency information to their listeners and viewers. Are these voluntary arrangements sufficient or should the Commission impose some uniform requirement?" (Federal Communications Commision 2004).

For example, news programming at the Macdona, Texas, Graniteville, South Carolina and the Minot, North Dakota derailments served as a means to augment the warnings that were not provided, or were late in arriving through the EAS network in these local areas. However, Allen suggests that although news programming continues at stations in larger markets, in smaller market stations local news has become more economically difficult to produce (Allen L. 1991). At some stations news departments are being eliminated and replaced with more network news programming (Anonymous 2004) (Anonymous 1991). Referencing a local emergency as an example, Bressers suggests that radio can no longer be depended upon for local news and cites David Rubin, dean of the Newhouse School of Public Communications at Syracuse University in New York:

"Rubin said he turned to the long time local AM radio news leader for its emergency broadcasting when the series of electrical failures that crippled parts of the Northeast, Midwest and Canada last August left his home in Fayetteville, N.Y. without power. 'If you don't have electric power, and you need to know what's happening, television, the Internet, the local newspaper -- none of them are of any use to you,' he said. Rubin knew what a radio station dedicated to local news would do: The news crew would report to work en masse regardless of prearranged shifts and schedules. The station's disaster coverage plan would be implemented and reporters would be dispatched to gather information at key sites. Local officials would be in the studio taking questions from anxious callers. Commercials would be suspended. A community that was literally in the dark would get information, and thus, the assurance that it had the information it needed to respond" (Bressers B. 2004 p.14).

Potter describes how University of Georgia journalism professor, Ann Hollified, was in Yankton, South Dakota during a violent thunderstorm:

"But for half an hour, all she heard was music and chatter. Not a single local radio station, it seemed, was covering the storm. On television, she found continuous coverage complete with tornado warnings. But the TV stations were in bigger communities about 60 miles away, and little Yankton was not their concern. 'I literally spent the evening at the window, staring into a raging storm,' Hollifield says, "hoping that if something was coming my way, I would hear it before it hit" (Potter D. 2000).

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its consequent effect of the deregulation of station ownership caps has been blamed for the increasing dearth in local news reporting (McKean M. and A. 1992) (Grossman L. 1998) (Morris D. 1997). In contrast, however, Murphy suggests that although corporate broadcasting is controlling a larger portion of the market, in the Chicago area some independent broadcasters are finding a niche by providing innovative local programming which might include local news (Murphy H. 2001). Another example was observed by this researcher during the Ice Storm of 1997 which impacted an area near the Gulf Coast of Texas and Louisiana. Very little coverage of the storm was pursued by the local primary one EAS station in Houston, KTRH, however, in Beaumont, Texas (a much smaller market) KLVI, maintained nearly non-stop coverage which included listener calls and interviews of local officials all through the storm (see Appendix IV). In addition, other technologies have now emerged that compete with radio, including television (Stempel G., H. et al. 1996) and the internet (Anonymous 1998) (Stempel G., T. Hargrove et al. 2000).

Indeed, television played an important role during the events of 9-11, (Kanihan S. and Gale K. 2003). However, this informational programming did not constitute operation of the EAS system. Rather, it was a supplement to the EAS. The EAS was not activated during the 9-11 events, however, in the silence of the EAS national news programming provided coverage of this event during and subsequently after the attacks occurred. Speaking to network news coverage acting as a supplement to the EAS, Michael Powell, FCC Chairman, stated that "The explosion of 24-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week media networks, the unbelievable ubiquity of coverage in some ways has proven to supplant those original conceptions of a senior leader's need to talk to the people. ... This sort of ubiquitous media environment and culture that we live in really provides pretty valuable vehicles for our leadership to communicate with the citizenry, short of the Emergency Alert System" (McConnell B. and D. Trigoboff 2001) Although the 9-11 event was a local event near the areas of attack, it was understood that: "There was no identifiable major threat to the entire country," said Richard Rudman, director of engineering for KFWB(AM) Los Angeles and head of the FCC's Emergency Alert System National Advisory Council's Coordinating Council for Local Stations [2001 #11]. Thus a presidential directive was not given to the whole country through the EAS system. In contrast the staff at Broadcasting & Cable suggest:

All of us, this page included, should have been far more appalled by the failure of the EAS system during 9/11. Actually, the system didn't fail. A coordinated, nationwide system to warn citizens of danger didn't even exist beyond the ad hoc one created by broadcasters and state officials and the even more ad hoc one created by TV and radio journalists as part of their job description. The stories of radios as lifelines for New Yorkers on Sept. 11 were many, but it had nothing to do with the Emergency Alert System, which, in its first real national emergency, issued no alert whatsoever. Almost three years later, it's no better prepared to do so. When a word from our government might have helped reassure a nation rocked to its core, what we got was a frightening silence (Staff 2004).

The ability of a radio station to augment an emergency event with local news coverage is part of the station's programming strategies. However, the action of programming breaking news which may be associated with a serious emergency should not be understood as the activation of the EAS. The covering of local news is a component of local service. Trigoboff suggests that the covering of local emergencies on radio is a component of localism and states that: "The decline of local radio news most greatly affects its historic stronghold: small-town and rural U.S., where television coverage was not universal and people depended on the ubiquitous radio for everything from tornado warnings to agricultural alerts" (Trigoboff D. 2002). The EAS is inclusively local, how be it, electronically connected at the local, state and national levels.

The Media Security and Reliability Council Survey
          The Media Security and Reliability Council, a public organization charged with "ensuring consistent, reliable, and accurate communication among the media, government, and the public when a public safety emergency is declared" (Media Security and Reliability Council 2003) conducted a nationwide EAS survey from January to April 2003. Data was compiled from all of the 50 states and presented in a report 23 May 2003 that summarized the data (Media Security and Reliability Council 2003). This survey, conducted by members of the subcommittee, Government to Media (Media Security and Reliability Council 2003) asked a series of questions to State Emergency Communications Committee (SECC) chairpersons, state broadcast associations and cable operators regarding the operation of the EAS in each of their respective states [2003 #390]. The result was the compilation of a series of qualitative statements made by these officials. One compilation of the survey information included responses to the question, "What are some problems with the system?" Overall:

"o This question elicited the most responses. State chairpersons responded to this question in paragraphs rather than sentences.
o It would be good to read the 'problems' section for each state. There were so many varied responses to this question that it is impossible to generalize. Many of the problems were specific to the state that replied to the survey.
o Many states said the system is too complicated and difficult to use during a real emergency. Also, broadcasters said the NWS used this system 'too much'. Many were upset with the daisy chain system in place in their state and said that they did not feel comfortable that a message could get to the entire state if a real emergency arose.
o The lack of funding and the need for new encoding equipment at the local level was a concern as well.
o NOTABLE QUOTES:
'No background channels assigned for EAS-only use.
Funding. Funding. Funding.....
Currently all non-federal EAS alerting is voluntary, this is a matter that continues to distress the credibility of the entire EAS.
Volunteers on all committees. It is getting very hard to find dedicated people to participate with system implementation.
System is only based on old analog technology.
As broadcasters and cable switch to a digital service, EAS is not easily deployed in this environment. Digitally implementing EAS has not been defined technically (nor required?).

The FCC needs to take the lead to direct how the media should provide EAS in this digital age.' Minnesota SECC

'Where do I begin.......Delivery, stupidity, false test, lack of training new people, things like commercials inadvertently included in the RMTs from the State Originating FM, etc., not to mention equipment failures in the "Daisy Chain".... with all of this causing the Broadcaster to be reluctant to participate. There has even been some ego 'Exclusive Amber station pretenses' PSAs broadcast, which has made other Broadcasters angry. But I am the 'whipping' post as they say and do what I can to take the licks...
There are other problems, but 'turf' wars, the worst in whatever flavor you could imagine exist in Louisiana. One silly battle was with the Amber Plan in that they wanted no adjoining states to be able to activate the Louisiana Statewide Amber Alert System, which in my opinion is practicing
political isolationism. Easy for a committee of egos to forget the reason for the Plan!
The Justice Department has fallen short with State 'Glue' and 'universal Plan' in the Federal Amber Alert System. They need to be more than a state sampling and interviewing system and should get to work and mandate the important issues which are important in saving lives! They could develop a 'Homeland Security Alert System Plan' or whatever you want to call it...bottom line is that
all states need to be on the same page. We are still the UNITED States aren't we?" Louisiana SECC 5-6)." (Media Security and Reliability Council 2003)

Identifying Issues of Localism found within the Scope of These Problems
So as to analyze the survey in the context of localism, a naturalistic approach was used to identify "salient elements in the samples and target in on these reoccurring themes" (Lincoln and Guba 1985 p.224). Given Newton's dualistic model of localism, that is, localism defined by both the geographic distribution of stations and the local programming needs of the communities in which they reside (Newton G. 1995), responses from the survey were identified that focused on both a spatial interactive theme, that is, themes dealing with spatial geographic connections, geographic linking of stations within the chain of stations, and ones that were oriented toward more operational and programming based issues such as: within the local programming area, needs dealing with the local human interface. (The categorized statements derived from the survey are listed in Appendix II Media Security and Reliability Survey data)

Findings Theme One
Spatial Geographic Connections; geographic linking of stations within the chain of stations

                Failure In the Linkage of the System Of 36 delineated and sorted responses derived from the statements made by EAS officials from 40 states, approximately 77 percent of the statements made within these responses reflect issues associated with poor reception of the EAS signal, weak linkages between stations and problems with the distribution of the audio signal quality. The failure of the daisy-chain aspect of the system emerges to produce weak links in the system . This leads to stations that can't receive the signal at all and limits the local area coverage or the signals. In two instances statements referring to linkage problems were revealed in tests. Two statements suggest the availability of stations handling EAS are limited; there are no PEP stations in our state, and in one area it was stated that stations can't hear who they are assigned to in this part of the state.

               Time Factor in Diffusion of the EAS Message Two responses suggested that the actual time it takes in the the relay process is detrimental.

                Electrical Generation Back Up Two comments referred to the lack of electrical backup at primary stations as an issue.

                The Deployment of the Digital EAS Four comments of the 40 samples refer to issues regarding the actual deployment of the digital system, and technical problems with the system. The shutting down of ancillary state operated two-way systems is cited as a problem as well as the dependence on non-functioning FM stations within the chain.

Findings Theme Two
Relations within the local programming area; needs dealing with the local human interface.

                Interactions with Local Government and Between Broadcasters Of 44 delineated and sorted responses derived from the statements made by EAS officials from 40 states. The highest number of statements (29%) related interactions with local government and between broadcasters planning. Within this group four themes emerged: participation by local authorities, participation by broadcasters, regulatory planning, and cable operations.
                Participation by Local Authorities This theme constituted the largest (46%) of the concern within this group. Getting help from various state agencies and establishing civil authority was an issue. The commitment and participation of state police was questionable. In one case county officials had not installed the hardware, although local broadcasters purchased the hardware and offered to install it . Political isolationism and egos were also blamed for problems within committees.
Participation by Broadcasters Problems with broadcasters (23% of the responses) being available to fill the vacancies when changes within the plan are made is a problem along with broadcasters reluctant to participate. Motivation is also an issue with one statement suggesting that a challenge exists to get engineers to take it seriously.
                Regulatory Planning Only 2 of the statements made in in this group related to the actual EAS planning process itself. One stated that there needs to be a coordinated standard for EAS on DTV and another referred to a Problem with the way the regulations are written.
Cable Operations Two statements also referred to the interface of cable operators with the EAS. Both related to planning and participation in the system by cable companies. Getting the cable systems to attend meetings regularly and get more involved in the plan going forward was one statement.
made along with a direct reference to companies such as Comcast and Charter Cable, which tend to do things their own way and treat EAS as an inconvenience and a legal requirement only.

                The EAS As a System in Itself Twenty percent of the group's statements referred to the operation of the EAS as a system within itself. Three of the statements of this group dealt with the complicated nature of the system suggesting the simpler the better and that broadcast engineers have to be available to be certain that monthly tests go smoothly. Reflecting on an alternative to the EAS, one statement suggested that, instead they do what has been done for years, and contact the media directly or have the media contact them. Most news agencies are hungry for news and jump to distribute warnings. There were two reference made to the limited diversity of distribution of the EAS suggesting that the system works if people are watching TV or listening to the radio! EAS needs to be through the NOAA weather radio so that people actually hear the alerts. The voluntary nature of the system was discussed from the stand- point that it is hard to know when a station is participating and when it chooses not to participate in any given event/activation.
One statement suggested that the system did not provide enough stating, "The system design is for a quick early general warning, but many agencies wishing to participate want more." One statement suggested that testing was a problem.

                 Funding Issues Eighteen percent of the responses dealt with some level of funding of the system. In one instance funds to better equip local government agencies with proper EAS equipment was cited as a problem. The question of the purely un-funded and unpaid volunteers who developed the systemwas also raised. In addition, non-federal EAS alerting is voluntary, This is a matter that continues to distress the credibility of the entire EAS. The consequence of this issue is that equipment is not being purchased.

                 Unattended Operations Issues related to facilities being unattended or not being manned 24 hours a day came up in three statements made by the group. The focus of concern is that there is no means to activate unattended or satellite-program-fed stations,and that broadcasters aren't passing things along as they should.

                Programming problems, Redundancies of Messages Four statements in this group referred to the erroneous use of the system. In one instance commercials inadvertently were included in the required monthly tests. False tests and over utilization of the system by the National were Weather Service were also cited as concern.

                Training In three statements, this group also cited training of personnel as an issue. Statements suggesting a lack of trainingand a need for constant education and training was noted. One statement suggested that the infrequent use of the system results in staff members unable to remember how to use it.

                Issues Related Directly to Consolidation and Shifts in Ownership Finally, only 3 statements from the sample contained references to the ownership of radio stations producing problems within the EAS. In some cases consolidation within a market has sometimes left the LP-1 and LP-2 in the same facility and no other station in the small markets willing to accept responsibility. In another case the responsibility that a station has assumed does not get passed on to new owners. This is the biggest problem. Some are very conscious of their responsibilities and some are not.