A Brief History of Public Radio-Based Warning Systems
             Atomic Era Homeland Defense It was in the early1950s, the beginnings of the atomic epoch (Green W. 2003), when the United States Government first devised the idea of a homeland defense system using a network of commercial radio stations. By the 1960s, in the heat of the cold war, that idea had mushroomed into a full blown series of civil defense organizations such as the Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Office of Civil Defense, amongst others, which all maintained a powerful network of public relations campaigns, curricular influences, the promotion of fallout shelter development and communications systems. It should be noted that although their was an inherent popularity to these civil defense programs, nevertheless, they were not without their critics. As Tiger suggests, the "hoopla" associated with government shelter programs and civil defence exercises, "act to fool the people into believing that they would be safe in a thermonuclear war" (Tiger M. 1961).

           CONELRAD The first commercial radio-based public civil defense communication system was initiated as the CONELRAD system in 1951 (Federal Communications Commission 2002). CONELRAD, which stood for Control of Electromagnetic Radiation was devised by an act of the Truman administration in 1952 (Truman H. 1952). The electromagnetic radiation that was being controlled in the CONELRAD system was simply the commercial AM radio station frequency spectrum of 540 to 1600 Kilohertz (United States 1953). This was accomplished by the manual limitation of transmissions from selected stations and the issuance of limited official (aural) messages being broadcast specifically on the frequencies of 640 and 1240 kilocycles (Pike J. 2003) (United States Federal Civil Defense Administration 1955).

          The strategy behind controlling these frequencies was related to the navigation systems on board contemporary enemy aircraft (United States Federal Civil Defense Administration 1955). It was understood that bombers launched against the U.S. would use emissions from AM radio (commercial) broadcast stations as a means to navigate to their urban targets. The CONELRAD network, when activated, required local radio stations at these two frequencies to vary their programming day by signing on and off at various hours with the intent of inhibiting the possibility of an ICBM looking for signals generated in a target city. CONELRAD gained incredible notoriety with the public and even radio manufacturers of that day were required to mark the CONELRAD frequencies of 640 and 1240 kilocycles with small Civil Defense (CD) triangles on the dials of the radios they sold. Also, however, in case of an attack, these frequencies were to be used to disseminate both local programming and national civil defense information. In the 10th Annual Broadcast Engineering Conference, Renton points to the effectiveness of scrambling navigation systems as a defense system and applauds the voluntary cooperation of broadcasters in the successfully tested CONELRAD deterrent system (Renton R. 1956).

           During the late fifties Television was quickly catching on in popularity (Lee L. 1998), however, the radio was still the ubiquitous medium of the time. Although the CONELRAD system was incorporated into television, CONELRAD relied on radio to provide the warning and the deterrent. A citizenry which was accustomed to the local character of radio of that time worked well with a warning system that was intended to be local in nature (Renton R. 1956 p.8). CONELRAD lasted only until the 1960s with the advent of more sophisticated guidance systems on the newly emerging weapon delivery technology, the Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) (Pike J. 2003) (Federation of American Scientists 2002).

            Adapting to Technology, the Emergency Broadcasting System The inadequacy of the technology of CONELRAD gave way to the Emergency Broadcasting System (EBS). Although both these systems shared the responsibility of public warning, unlike CONELRAD, the EBS did not act as an active navigational deterrent. In similar fashion, both systems had voluntary participating and non-participating stations in their networks. In addition, both required non-participating stations to leave the air during an actual emergency. But this system focused on the dissemination of presidential announcements.

"The Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) was developed for the purpose of providing the President of the United States and the heads of state and local governments with a means of communicating with the general public in the event of a major or widespread emergency.
The National EBS can be activated only on orders from the President. The activation notification (Emergency Action Notification-EAN) will be sent to the major radio and TV networks, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T), the Associated Press (AP) and the United Press International (UPI). From these points the EAN will be disseminated throughout the country by teletype and broadcast" (Federal Communications Commission 1976p. 71).

Basically the EBS system was a modernization of CONELRAD. In the event of an emergency, stations at various frequencies, up and down the AM and FM dial, would become activated and would commence with broadcasting governmental and local information pertinent to the emergency. Although the system was never activated for a nuclear attack, it was activated thousands of times for weather-related issues.

         The EBS system, enacted during the Kennedy administration in 1963, worked with a hierarchy of radio stations (Federation of American Scientists 2003). Larger high-power stations acted as regional primary stations for the EBS. These, in turn, sent the EBS signal to smaller secondary stations. In its simplest format, the system itself was an analog air monitor that could hear a tone being sent by another station over that station's licensed frequency. In some cases, where monitoring a station was not feasible other means were used. It was noted by this researcher that in 1974 radio station KSPT in Sandpoint, Idaho was unable to receive EBS alerts from the primary station in Spokane due to its geographic location. However, the station was able to monitor television from Spokane and so a television monitor set to a local Spokane station was incorporated into the studio layout. This was checked by operators for EBS tests. If a test was sent via television, it was noted in the station operation logs. After the tone was received, the operator read a statement over the air introducing and closing down the test.

         Unlike CONELRAD which focused on national defense from a military attack, it was found that the EBS could also act as an emergency messaging system for local emergencies such as weather and other hazardous conditions. "As of the beginning of 1996 the FCC had received 20,341 reported activations of EBS (since 1976). Approximately 85% of these activations were for weather-related emergencies. The number of activations was most assuredly higher as stations were not required to report their usage of the system" (Federation of American Scientists 2003). Over the years the EBS system began to exhibit the following problems:

"First, the threat of a national emergency diminished. Second, many states didn't utilize the benefits of the EBS for local emergencies.
Third, more and more broadcast stations were allowed to operate unattended thereby making the relay of any warning message impossible. Even if a station was attended, if the control operator stepped out of the room when an alert came in, the operator was not there to manually handle it.
Fourth, the long, obnoxious EBS tones used in the weekly tests served to drive listeners away to other stations. Fifth, listeners could have a false sense of security about a system that local officials never planned to use or failed to use. Sixth, and perhaps one of the most important weaknesses was that the EBS depended upon the domino theory; i.e., if the primary station failed for any reason, none of the other broadcasters could receive and retransmit the warning" (State of California EAS 2002).

For some broadcasters, the activation of the EBS, the tone, and the time spent in the interruption of programming was a bother. Listeners were reported to be tuning out when the 60 second long test tone came on the air (Leibowitz and Associates 2000) (McConnel C. 1994). Once again technology was changing and by 1994 a new system was being announced by the FCC.

        The Digital Emergency Alert System Arrives The FCC announced the shift from EBS to the Emergency Alert System (EAS) in 1994. The new system would be phased in between June 1995 and January 1998 with the ultimate name change coming in (McConnel C. 1994) (Runyon S. 1998). The digital format of the EAS was the major difference between it and its EBS counterpart. This new system would allow for a fully automated process that could control EAS monitors and on-air messages through a process of digital electronic signals. In addition, beyond radio and television, the new EAS would encompass other broadcast media such as cable systems and its automation would bring with it a whole new synergy between emergency management strategy and various kinds of messaging systems (Chartrand S. 1993).

        The flexibility of the EAS comes from its digital architecture. Early on the FCC began promoting the integration of EAS with "wireless cable, video dial tone, and satellite master antenna systems (McConnel C. 1994). In addition, there have been discussions about integrating the system with cellular telephone (Lowell 1998), satellite radio and the internet. However, costs that might be incurred by linking these systems to EAS have been the bottom-line argument against this advance of the system. Presently there are special consumer grade devices available that can be programmed to pick up the EAS digital messaging system.

        The digital component of the EAS allows the user to selectively define the type of and the target location of warnings that the system will respond to. Each station, by law, must have their EAS decoder monitor two emergency sources. These sources might originate from another radio or television station or some other agency capable of initiating an emergency activation. This is a major difference compared to the hierarchical type relay that existed in systems in the past. Although a network of stations may exist that can activate each other, now, outside sources can also activate the system. Schematically then, this presents a network of stations connected within a web of sources rather than a set of nodes linked in linear fashion (Washington Military Department Emergency Management Division 2004).

         In some stations, economy of scale is achieved by cutting personnel and incorporating digital automation systems to operate the station (Bressers B. 2004). With more sophisticated digital remote control available, an increasing trend toward this hands-off approach to broadcasting is evident (Mims B. 1998). The digital EAS complements this type of broadcasting with its ability to operate robotically. Stations that are unattended can set their EAS decoder to automatically put alerts over the air. The system logs the event time and codes and prints out a ticket that gives further specifics of event.

         Participation in the EAS is voluntary, however, it is an FCC requirement that each station acquire and maintain an EAS decoder. At this time the FCC requires that the EAS be linked to AM and FM radio and television stations and cable providers only. Furthermore, the FCC rules only require stations to monitor EAS messages and only broadcast national emergency messages from the President.

         EAS, as a stand alone messaging system, was developed with the idea of being able to feed the system with multiple sources. Broadcasters were the disseminators and agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), local, regional, and state emergency management agencies and the National Weather Service (NWS) were sources for EAS messages. The National Weather service has a long tradition in weather broadcasting (Williams J. 1998). However, recently the National Weather Service's NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administrations) Weather Radio service is now also referred to as All Hazards Radio service (National Weather Service 2004). A recent Associated Press release stated:

"Government officials say terror warnings will soon be added to an expanded weather radio network. The coordinated effort will allow the network to broadcast all emergency warnings on a regional level.
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration will join forces with the Homeland Security Department. Terror alerts will now be issued automatically, in the same way warnings are now sent out about inclement weather and missing children. The system encodes messages to a specific area where a threat occurs. It reaches 97 percent of the nation and is assisted by the Federal Emergency Management Agency" (Associated Press 2004).

          Organizationally the EAS acts within state and regional EAS plans that reflect both its geographically spatial and hierarchical nature (Figure 1). State EAS plans are required by the FCC and are developed to organize functional regions within the state for management of information to designate the level at which a station participates (i.e. Local Primary, Regional Relay, or Primary Entry Point Stations), and to map out the various monitoring assignments that each one of the stations in the network will maintain.

"When EAS is being implemented in a given region, broadcasters, cable operators, emergency managers and others concerned form State and Local Emergency Communication Committees (SECCs and/or LECCs). They design a monitoring plan that determines what entities will serve as the EAS sources and originators of messages (EOCs, 911 centers, NWR, etc.)." (Partnership for Public Awareness 2003 p.14).

         All Hazards Radio NOAA Weather Radio, or All Hazards Radio has emerged as a significant monitoring source by stations participating in the EAS. An example of the types of events available to stations monitoring NOAA weather radio as an EAS source include:

1. Natural (e.g., tornado, hurricane, floods, earthquakes)
2. Technological accidents (e.g., chemical release, oil spill, nuclear power
3. Plant emergencies, maritime accidents, train derailments)
4. AMBER alerts
5. Terrorist attacks (National Weather Service 2004) (National Weather Service 2004)

        Concerns With the System In February of 2004 the Partnership for Public Warning (PPW) (Partnership for Public Awareness 2004), a nonprofit agency composed of individuals and organizations associated with the emergency warning community published a guide which outlined some of the major problems that exist within the EAS.

"There are three main concerns preventing EAS from becoming a truly effective system and, therefore, depriving the nation from having a unified warning system.
o The PEP system cannot be monitored reliably by all of the state level EAS network entry points. Also, the major networks, national cable program suppliers and other national networks are not part of the national level EAS.
o Government leadership and support has diminished. No one government agency is in charge of the system. Areas of concern include outdated EAS plans, missing communication links, and lack of training and equipment for emergency managers.
o There is no concerted government/industry effort that combines EAS and other alerting techniques with existing and new technologies to form a combined warning system. In addition to radio, television and cable, people now have wired and wireless Internet, cell phones, pagers, etc., that must be part of the warning process" (Partnership for Public Awareness 2003 p.8).

In particular the issue surrounding "government leadership and support" has contributed to ambiguity in EAS plans. California State Chairman of the Emergency Alert System and member of the board of trustees of the PPW, James Gabbert, in an e-mail to this researcher concurred that, "When they re-wrote the EAS rules somehow the FCC got out of it and now they handle only the national emergency plan, but not the state or local. If I, as state chair, were to resign A, I have no one to resign to, and B, I have no one to appoint a successor" (Gabbert J. 2004). State and regional plans are crucial to the operation of this system, for the most part of its existence, has shown its usefulness at the state and local level and has never been activated in an emergency of national proportions (State of California EAS 2002) . In 2003, the Media Security and Reliability Council (MSRC) (Federal Communications Commission 2002) a federal advisory committee under the auspices of the FCC, conducted a survey of the EAS in fifty states and found that:

"o Many states said the system is too complicated and difficult to use during a real emergency. Also, broadcasters said the NWS used this system 'too much'. Many were upset with the daisy chain system in place in their state and said that they did not feel comfortable that a message could get to the entire state if a real emergency arose.
o The lack of funding and the need for new encoding equipment at the local level was a concern as well" (Media Security and Reliability Council 2003 p.5)

The survey also reported that in some states such Primary Entry Point stations could not be monitored directly and in some cases alternative methods (i.e. a state relay, monitoring a station which in turn can monitor a PEP) could not even be used ( p.5).

Threats to Infrastructure Integrity In addition, external security threats against the electronic, as well as mechanical, infrastructure exit to the EAS which could also impact its operation . Poulsen reports that:

"Security and encryption were not the primary design criteria when EAS was developed and initially implemented," the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) wrote in a public notice launching a review of the system. "Now, however, emergency managers are becoming more aware of potential vulnerabilities within the system. For example, the complete EAS protocol is a matter of public record and potentially subject to malicious activations or interference" (Poulsen K. 2004).

The unprotected exposure of mechanical infrastructure such as antennas, antenna towers, dish and microwave reflectors and wires, is also subject to subversion and sabotage as well as natural hazards. For example, in discussing the broadcasting infrastructure connected to San Francisco's Sutro Tower, James Gabbert owner of KOFY TV, in 1997, said of this one particular structure that it's the "...most important tower in America." Gabbert says the tower was instrumental to state and local officials during the 1989 earthquake, recent floods and other emergencies, and is unique because it reaches the hearing impaired. "You would lose a lot of lives if that thing (Sutro Tower) went down," predicted Gabbert (Dimmick C. 1997). Seeing the need for security around these structures in a report titled "Adopted best Practices" the MSRC suggests that "All media companies should reassess their vulnerabilities considering the possibility of deliberate attacks, in addition to natural disasters and equipment failures, and take appropriate measures to prevent loss of service and to expedite rapid recovery" (Media Security and Reliability Council Prevention Task Force 2004).

                Back Up Power Sources and Facilities If a station is attacked and knocked off the air by way of an insurgent action or by way of a strong wind, and if that station is an active participant in the EAS, its challenge for itself is to get back on the air as soon as possible. In the most extreme example of station defense, part of the EBS plan of the past provided for stations to be included in the Broadcast Station Protection Program (BSPP) (Media Security and Reliability Council 2003). Focused toward PEP type stations, funding was provided for building/studio reinforcement and back up power generation. In the early 1970 's this researcher worked in one of these stations (KPQ, Wenatchee) that was capable of running all broadcast operations from an alternative bomb shelter studio. It is reported that "...in 1976 over 600 broadcast stations were participating in the BSPP. As EBS state plans were developed and key state entry point stations were selected, BSPP equipment had to be provided to these selected stations because of their standing in the overall EBS structure" (Partnership for Public Awareness 2003 p.19). In the 1980s funding for this program was almost completely stopped. The PPW reports that presently "about 40 stations in the BSPP that still have BSPP equipment in service including the PEP stations" ( p.19). The EAS is often referred to by broadcasters as an unfunded government mandate (Steffler A. 2004). The PPW suggests: "Support for developing and maintaining EAS plans has decreased over the years. Furthermore, the EAS is essentially an un-funded Federal government mandate, with the FCC focusing on enforcement of EAS regulations. Therefore the present EAS is quite inhomogeneous and prone to failure, unlike the earlier EBS where more operational plans were in effect" (Partnership for Public Awareness 2003 p.15).

              Alternative 'EAS' The PPW is a strong advocate of an integrated EAS system which incorporates a wide range of communication devises including cellular phones, pagers, and the internet (Anonymous 2002) (Lemos R. 2002) (Dizard III W. 2002). In cities such as Minot, North Dakota, alternatives to the broadcast-based EAS are well. Since the train derailment of 2003 the city of Minot, in conjunction with its surrounding county (Ward county) has totally integrated its emergency management program with sirens, broadcast EAS, and the Community Alert Network (CAN). The CAN system allows for the use of modified Geographic Information System software (GIS) to delineate an area of residences and then selectively call each residence with a recorded message (Community Alert Network 2004). Scott Harris Scott, on scene coordinator for the Environmental Protection Agency in Dallas, Texas stated that a similar system is in place in the Bexar County Texas emergency management area (Harris S. 2004).

               In cases where an emergency takes out a wide range of conventional communications amateur radio can be a viable communications option (Bischoff G. 2004) and support link to the EAS system. Amateur radio (American Radio Relay League 1999) is another part of the composite EAS system (Federal Emergency Management Agency 1983) which has served in a number of disasters including the attacks on September 11 2001 (Armbrust D. 2003). During the Loma Prieta, California earthquake in 1989 this researcher was asked, like many other amateur radio operators (Perkins T. 2004) to activate his amateur station to handle health and welfare traffic from the Bay area into eastern Washington State. Amateur radio and some commercial radio were the only options for passing messages at that time when the phone lines were destroyed. In the aftermath of Hurricane Charlie telephone service was cut off to the severely damaged areas in Florida. The Salvation Army's Team Emergency Radio Network (SATERN), an amateur radio operation based in Chicago, Ill, handled health and welfare traffic from across Florida during the event (Staff 2004). Amateur radio and the Hurricane Watch Network (HWN) has played a crucial role for emergency communications in the onslaught of hurricane Ivan as it has passed over the Carribean:

"International Amateur Radio Union Region 2 Emergency Coordinator Arnie Coro, CO2KK, in Havana, praised the HWN for its "outstanding" coordination in collecting ground-level weather data from stations in Cuba. CO2KK was the HWN liaison station, and he was prepared to operate with low power from a battery in the event of power loss.Hundreds of Cuban radio amateurs were active to provide communication as Ivan passed over the northwestern end of the island this week. Coro reports that nearly 800 radio amateurs along the Cuban archipelago were involved in handling emergency traffic related to Hurricane Ivan. As of September 14, Coro said he had spent some 55 hours in continuous operation handling emergency traffic to the affected area. Hundreds of Cuban radio amateurs were active to provide communication as Ivan passed over the northwestern end of the island this week. Coro reports that nearly 800 radio amateurs along the Cuban archipelago were involved in handling emergency traffic related to Hurricane Ivan. As of September 14, Coro said he had spent some 55 hours in continuous operation handling emergency traffic to the affected area" (American Radio Relay League 2004).

 

Presently some amateur radio repeater systems are incorporating NOAA weather radio, and Amber Alerts (Anderson D. and Fleeman 2004)
(Spring T. 2003). Chris O'Hearn, engineer for Family Radio Incorporated (WIZM, WKTY, WRQT, WKTY), La Crosse, Wisconsin is the chair for the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) and also an amateur radio operator. In one of the largest emergency drills conducted in a rural area (Operation Heartland (Springer D. 2004)) O'Hearn stated in an interview with this researcher that during Operation Heartland drill "the amateur radio community participated in this drill with great success" and actually handled some of the radio traffic to supplement conventional systems used by local authorities. (O'Hearn C. 2004)

A Heritage of Emergency Messaging The present day EAS system has evolved through a series of paradigm shifts focusing on how it should be used, and what is should be used for. Paralleling these philosophical, political and economic themes and issues is the environment of the ever expanding technological options in which it operates. Some suggest that the system works well by itself, and some suggest the need for integrating it with other options. The attitudes of the listening public, the consumers of the EAS, have also evolved. According to the Radio Advertising Bureau there are approximately 540.5 million and 215 million television sets in the United States (Central Intelligence Agency 1999). Yet during the 11 of September attacks of 2001 a Harris Interactive report suggests that "adults in the US referred to the television (78%) and the radio (15%) as their primary sources of information after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon" (Center for Media Research 2001).

Broadcast Radio, Still Vital in EAS In its most basal form, EAS is simply a communications system. Communication systems require an input mechanism, an output mechanism and a supply of data as well as a rationale for conveying it. The focus of this research, and its limitation, is on the use of commercial broadcast radio in the EAS matrix. In particular this research considers the new technology and the current regulatory atmosphere and examines how radio has managed as a disseminator for emergency messages. For this research, all other conveyances are ancillary to the broadcast-based EAS. In all but three of the public information reports on survival techniques published by the American Red Cross, reference was made to the need of a battery operated radio as part of the survival kit (American Red Cross 2004; American Red Cross 2004; American Red Cross 2004; American Red Cross 2004; American Red Cross 2004; American Red Cross 2004; American Red Cross 2004; American Red Cross 2004; American Red Cross 2004; American Red Cross 2004; American Red Cross 2004; American Red Cross 2004; American Red Cross 2004; American Red Cross 2004; American Red Cross 2004).
On their holiday web site, FEMA suggests:

"The holidays are a great time to give an important, inexpensive gift that helps people prepare for disasters and to reduce their risk," said FEMA Director James Lee Witt. "These suggested gifts are a wonderful way of making 1998 a safer year for everyone(Federal Emegency Management Agency 2003). On the list is a radio with extra batteries. At FEMA's "Things To Know" site for children, a battery operated radio is part of a winter storm preparation (Federal Emegency Management Agency 2003).

        Thus, this research suggests that radio is still a viable means of communicating emergency messages. Considered to be one of the worst storms to strike the Pacific Northwest (National Weather Service 2004), the Columbus Day Storm of 1962, put all but one Portland Oregon radio station (KGW) off the air. Speaking to the efforts of the staff and others associated with the emergency communications delivered during the storm by KGW, in 1962 Pat Krafton, station manager of KGW radio suggests:

"What was done by radio that friday night of October 12 and the following days of recovery is what you have every right to expect of us. But there are lessons to be learned for the future. No transmitter can be of value to you unless you have a receiver to remain in touch with your fellow human beings. To know what is going on and where your help is needed, to aide those less fortunate than yourselves, or merely to follow instructions and thereby minimize confusion and tragedy, the role of the portable transistor radio receiver certainly became an extremely important one. It became the link to reassurance and vital information. Certainly now what should be apparent to all is that no family should be without a transistor in working order. Similarly the radios in our cars must be kept in working order, because many of us will again be caught on the road. In time of need radio will be there again to give immediate help when you need it. But you must be able to listen if radio is to work for you. Now, I would like to express our heartfelt appreciation to all of you who helped us at KGW. The many public officials, the police and fire departments throughout our listening area; the ham radio operators and many others too numerous to name. But particularly we want to thank you, our listeners, who tuned to KGW the night of the terrible 12th. Thank you for helping us and thank you for your many heart warming letters and calls which have poured into the station these past few days. It has been our privilege to serve you" (Krafton P. 1962).

         Jack Capell, now retired, was the staff meteorologist for KGW in 1962. He was instrumental in broadcasting an alert to his Portland area listeners suggesting the possibility of this very large storm hitting the Willamette Valley. In an interview this researcher had with Capell, he was asked what he felt was the major motivation for KGW to respond the way it did during this storm and other natural emergencies during its long tenure as a Portland Broadcaster. Capell suggested:

"That was a different set up in those days in a lot of ways. The owner of the station at that time was Dorothy Bullitt. She ran that station in the most conscientious way a person could. She had commitment to the public and a commitment to quality and useful broadcasting. She didn't care about ratings that much; she wanted quality. In those days when Dorothy was heading it up, you can bet if it was worth-while information; wise and good entertainment, that's what interested Dorothy" (Capell J. 2004).

        Others formally associated with this award-winning regional station concur that management style dedicated to public service, provided the foundation for this station's strong philosophy of localism (Port of Portland 2001). This research now turns to defining localism and its connections to the EAS and in turn its alliance with public service.